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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My dissertation contributes to the accountability literature in international 
relations by examining the role constituents’ preferences can potentially play in 
fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies. In times of 
international crises, domestic audiences have specific coercive foreign policy 
preferences and will support executives who represent them when selecting coercive 
foreign policies. Executive actions will increase popular support or generate audience 
costs depending on whether these actions are consistent with the specific policy 
preferences that domestic audiences have given the threat a crisis poses to national 
security. To determine when audiences prefer economic or military coercion and how 
these preferences affect their evaluation of the executive I conduct three experiments, 
including a survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of Americans and 
an experiment conducted with a convenience sample in the United Kingdom. The results 
show interesting similarities and differences between the cross-national samples 
regarding foreign policy preferences and the public’s propensity to support and punish 
leaders during times of international conflict. Mainly, I find that (1) the concept of 
audience costs can be expanded to cases of economic coercion, (2) under certain 
circumstances audience costs operate even in crises that are not very salient and (3) 
when there is a mismatch between public preferences and threats issued by the 
executive, audience costs do not operate at all. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As of January 2012, U.S. sanctions against Iran include blocking access to the 
international financial system and undermining the Iranian gas and oil industry (Cooper 
2012). President Obama has stated that these sanctions were implemented to protect the 
national security interests of United States and the world community (Goldberg 2012). 
In an election year, it would be difficult to argue that this escalation of economic 
sanctions has nothing to do with the preferences of American citizens. Fifty-eight 
percent of Americans agree that the United States should prevent Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons, even if it involves military action. Popular preferences are not static 
and have changed as Iran’s nuclear program has continued to develop. Domestic 
audiences are starting to perceive economic coercion against Iran as ineffective. As of 
February of 2012, 64% of Americans declare that escalating sanctions will not deter Iran 
(up from 56% in October 2009).1 Presidential hopefuls seem to be taking note, as talk of 
military action against Iran has become a popular stance in GOP debates in 2012.   
In this dissertation, I examine under what circumstances democratic constituents 
will support or punish executives for their foreign policy behaviors in times of 
international crises.2 I specify the role public policy preferences and executive 
inconsistencies play in generating support for executives and their coercive foreign 
                                                 
1
 Pew Research Center poll, February 15, 2012, available at: http://www.people-
press.org/2012/02/15/public-takes-strong-stance-against-irans-nuclear-program/, accessed March 5 2012.  
2
 This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 
1123291. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
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policies. I first theorize about what affects public preferences for military and economic 
coercion. I then examine how these policy preferences influence when democratic 
leaders will be punished for not following through on threats of military or economic 
coercion.  My dissertation contributes to the accountability literature in international 
relations by examining the role constituents’ preferences can potentially play in 
fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies.  
Theories of democratic accountability have had a significant impact in the field 
of international relations. However, no consensus exists as to the specific role 
constituents’ preferences play when it comes to fomenting or restraining the initiation of 
coercive foreign policies. At present two unconnected groups of accountability theories 
exist in international relations literature. A first group of theories emphasizes how 
citizens hold leaders accountable if they do not represent their policy preferences. A 
second group of theories has emerged from game theoretical models of domestic 
audience costs. In these models the relevant issue is whether leaders act consistently 
between what they promise they will do and the foreign policies they actually 
implement. It is assumed that people invariantly prefer consistent leaders and that this 
preference constrains the public commitments and actions made by democratic leaders in 
international crises.   
Audience costs have played a paramount role in international relations in the past 
decades (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Downes and Sechser 2012). Even limited 
audience costs have been shown to affect crisis bargaining (Tarar and Leventoglu 2012). 
However, prominent international relations scholars have recently questioned the 
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usefulness of the concept (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012; Downes and 
Sechser 2012). In this dissertation I address these critiques and show that specifying how 
executive actions in times of crises interact with public expectations refines the concept 
of audience costs, making it applicable to types of crises not considered by previous 
literature.  
This study bridges the gap that exists between these two types of accountability 
theories. By empirically identifying the preferences of domestic audiences for coercive 
action in times of international crises, I provide one of the first systematic tests of how 
both public policy preferences and preferences for consistent leaders affect democratic 
accountability. The coercive foreign policies I examine are the threat of military action 
and the imposition of economic sanctions. Thus, this research also helps connect 
literature that highlights the role of domestic dynamics in military and economic 
coercion. The theory I set forth in this dissertation thus brings together two previously 
unconnected strands of accountability literature and expands the applicability of the 
concept of audience costs to cases of economic coercion and to crises that do not pose a 
significant threat to national security.3  
The objective of this dissertation is to examine under what circumstances 
democratic audiences can potentially pressure their leaders into engaging in certain 
coercive foreign policy responses while constraining the implementation of others. The 
role played by domestic audiences in fomenting coercive foreign policies has been the 
subject of less empirical research than the role domestic audiences play in constraining 
                                                 
3
 The concept of audience costs was created to analyze bargaining behavior in highly salient crises and has 
been applied primarily to militarized disputes. 
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democratic leader’s aggressive actions.4 This dissertation will incorporate both ‘push’ 
and ‘pull’ forces into a theoretical framework in which constituents have different 
foreign policy preferences depending on how salient they perceive a crisis to be. In my 
model, citizens’ foreign policy preferences are variable, in contrast to many international 
relations theories regarding the role of domestic accountability that assume that domestic 
audiences are intrinsically less inclined to aggressive foreign policies than their leaders 
(Levy 1998). Leaders’ approval can increase or decrease following foreign policy 
responses they either enact or fail to enact (either publicly committing to a given course 
of foreign policy action or actually implementing it).  
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In this section, I describe the role of public 
foreign policy preferences5 in theories of international relations and clarify how I define 
democratic accountability. I then present recent criticisms that have been made about 
audience cost theory and mention how my research resolves these issues. The following 
section outlines my theoretical framework. It describes how public preferences for 
certain coercive foreign policies vary depending on how salient they perceive an 
international crisis to be and addresses how these preferences affect the likelihood of 
audience costs being paid. The methods section describes the experiments by which my 
                                                 
4
 There is however, historical evidence of domestic audiences ‘pushing’ their representatives into enacting 
costly foreign policies. President McKinley, for instance, felt tremendous popular pressure to go to war 
with Spain in the 1890s (Levy 1998:152).  
5
 The terms “preference” and “attitude” are often used indistinguishably in studies of international 
relations. Preferences have been defined as “the ordering of choices according to desirability” (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2006:704). In his famous book of foreign policy decision-making Vertzberger defines attitudes 
as “an ideological formation having affective and cognitive dimensions that create a disposition for a 
particular pattern of behavior toward specific objects or categories of objects and social situations or some 
combination thereof” (1990:127-8). Attitudes help shape preferences and both attitudes and preferences 
influence behavior.  
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theory was tested with a representative sample of American adults, and also cross-
nationally with convenience samples in the United States and the United Kingdom. I 
conclude with a summary of the findings and their implications for accountability 
research.  
 
1.1. The Public as a Unit of Analysis in International Relations 
Are democratic leaders held accountable for foreign policy promises and actions? 
Political scientists in general and international relations scholars in particular, have 
underscored the central role accountability plays in democracies. It has been posited that 
democratic leaders will be motivated to pursue public goods instead of private ones in 
order to build as wide a support-base as possible and thus enhance their possibilities of 
re-election (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 2004; Chiozza and 
Goemans 2003; Goemans 2000). The most common form of public goods is national 
policies. Democratic accountability mechanisms –such as elections– motivate leaders to 
adopt political stances believed to best represent the preferences of their constituents, not 
just their personal preferences. This feature applies to both domestic and foreign 
policies, and in itself would make democratic regimes a normatively desirable form of 
government. Democratic accountability also makes democracies proceed more 
cautiously when selecting conflicts to engage in, relative to autocracies. Democratic 
leaders, in order to remain in power, are constrained from waging war when domestic 
audiences do not perceive such a course of action as representing their own personal 
preferences. 
 6 
 
 International relations theories are increasingly incorporating domestic factors to 
further understanding of international phenomena. The realist paradigm that viewed 
international politics as the product of interactions among states acting as unitary 
entities, driven exclusively by exterior influences, has not been able to account for 
important variations in conflict behavior. Focusing on the domestic dynamics that 
motivate leaders to initiate and maintain foreign policies allows scholars to view the end 
product of a set of these actions (inter-state war, economic sanctions, etc.) while 
analyzing the strategic considerations that lead to these outcomes. As Bueno de 
Mesquita states bluntly, “International relations is, simply put, a venue for politicians to 
gain or lose domestic political advantage. From this viewpoint, concepts such as the 
national interest, grand strategy, and international politics as a domain distinct from 
foreign and domestic calculations are troubling” (2002:8).   
The prevalent theoretical perspective in international relations today highlights 
the importance of strategic interactions across different political realms. Theories 
pertaining to the initiation of military inter-state conflict, as well as theories that focus on 
public reactions to economic sanctions have incorporated the logic of Putnam’s ‘two-
level games’ (1988) in which actions at an international level cannot be fully understood 
without considering domestic political factors. My research will build on these models 
and fill theoretical gaps regarding executive-public relations.  
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1.2. Do Audiences Even Have Foreign Policy Preferences?  
For decades the overarching consensus in international relations was that public 
opinion was too volatile and lacking in structure and coherence to possibly have any 
impact on foreign policy (Holsti 1992). The popular Almond-Lippmann thesis posited 
that people did not possess sufficient knowledge about international affairs to have any 
type of preferences on foreign issues (Lippmann 1922, 1925; Almond 1950). This view 
started changing after the Vietnam War, and today the prevailing consensus is that 
democratic leaders consider public opinion when conducting foreign policy. Even 
Walter Lippmann changed his mind and started to view American citizens as possibly 
more enlightened than the American government at times (Holsti 1992).  
Scholars began challenging the Almond-Lippmann thesis by showing that not 
only do Americans have foreign policy preferences,6 but also that changes in these 
preferences were rationally tied to international events (Caspary 1970; Mueller 1973; 
Page and Shapiro 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 
1992; Popkin 1994; but see Zaller 1992), as opposed to being random. Even if citizens 
do not have a thorough knowledge of international affairs (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Holsti 2004), they can form preferences based on what information is available to 
them. This corresponds with the famous argument posited by Anthony Downs (1957), 
namely that acquiring political information is a costly endeavor, and the rational choice 
is most frequently to consume information indirectly from a designated source like a 
                                                 
6
 I summarize the literature addressing the specific types of foreign policy preferences citizens have in the 
theoretical section of this dissertation. Here I only wish to highlight that citizens do have foreign policy 
preferences and that these can impact foreign policy in democratic states.  
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media spokesperson. As noted by Holsti, “even in the absence of much factual 
knowledge, members of the mass public use some simple—perhaps even simplistic—
heuristics in order to make sense of an increasingly complex world; a few salient criteria 
rather than complete information may serve as the basis of judgment” (1992:450). The 
use of informational shortcuts can thus allow even relatively uninformed citizens to form 
general foreign policy preferences (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; 
Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1993). This implies that relatively 
uninformed voters who rely on heuristics can make the same political choice they would 
have made had they been in a knowledgeable position (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998; Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006).7  
 Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989) and Vavreck (2009) find that the public 
frequently considers foreign issues as one of the most important problems faced by the 
United States and that foreign policy attitudes can be consequential in presidential 
elections. Anand and Krosnick (2003) also find that citizens’ foreign policy attitudes 
affect candidate evaluation. Voters prefer candidates with whom they share foreign 
policy goals. This is particularly the case when candidates take a clear foreign policy 
                                                 
7
 Some research in the American political behavior subfield questions the usefulness of heuristics and 
political knowledge. Lau & Redlawsk (1997) find that when people with low sophistication use heuristics 
as information shortcuts in political decision-making processes, their choices are more effective. On the 
other hand, they find that political sophisticates are worse off when they employ heuristics. Other studies 
show that possessing information is not a relevant factor in making political decisions. Lodge et al (1995) 
experimentally demonstrate that memory-based models in which political information must be stored in 
order to affect vote choice are flawed. They propose an on-line process, where an affective evaluation of 
incoming information takes place instantly. The resulting “affective tally” is what determines vote choice. 
Employing this mechanism would be rational, for individuals do not have to expend scarce cognitive 
resources storing bundles of political facts. 
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stance. When this does not occur audiences can often infer a candidate’s position by 
relying on heuristics such as political ideology or party affiliation.  
 How do people form foreign policy preferences? Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and 
Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) propose that individuals use informational shortcuts or 
cognitive heuristics following a hierarchical structure in which higher-level beliefs 
influence responses to lower-level stimuli. When exposed to specific foreign policies an 
individual may not know much about (such as nuclear arms policy or international 
trade), these are interpreted guided by general beliefs that can ameliorate the effect of 
missing or ambiguous information with default values so the person can reach a 
conjectural judgment (Taylor and Crocker 1981; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Hurwitz 
and Peffley 1987). For instance, a citizen may decide whether to favor U.S. military 
intervention in Yemen depending on whether his general posture is isolationist or 
interventionist or by relying on core values such as personal views on ethnocentrism or 
on the morality of forceful coercion (1987:1105).  
 Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser (1991) draw from interactionist models popular in 
social psychology and posit that the decision to support military interventions is made 
based on both personal dispositional beliefs and the consideration of objective 
geopolitical calculations. They conduct a series of national experiments and find that 
individuals’ levels of assertiveness and internationalism interact with strategic 
considerations such as whether American interests are at stake in a crises, the relative 
power of an adversary, and whether the crisis invol
 10 
 
Domestic audiences are more likely to acquire information of foreign affairs in times of 
international crises. Previous studies have focused on the role American public opinion 
has played in specific foreign policies such as Nicaragua (Sobel 2001) or Somalia 
(Klarevas 2002). Baum and Potter note that most research distinguishes between public 
foreign policy opinion in times of crises and in absence of a crisis. They note that, 
“whereas the public is typically not closely attuned to the details of international politics, 
crises often appear to attract public attention” (2008:44). Consequently, studying 
domestic public opinion of coercive foreign policies in times of international crises, as I 
do in this project, is of particular importance to democratic accountability. 
    
1.3. Public Opinion and Coercive Foreign Policy in Democracies  
A democracy is by definition the rule of the majority. As highlighted by the 
strategic approach to international relations, in a democracy leaders wish to stay in 
power, and the primary way to achieve this goal is by representing the preferences of the 
mass public when designing and implementing policies (Bueno de Mesquita 2006). As 
discussed above, numerous studies show that people have foreign policy preferences. 
However, exactly how these preferences affect the actual implementation of foreign 
policies is not as clear (Holsti 1992). We know that pubic preferences and foreign 
policies tend to correlate with one another (see for instance Kusnitz 1984; Monroe 1979, 
1998). What we don’t know is the direction of the causal arrow here. Some scholars 
propose that foreign policy elites frame their foreign policy decisions in a way that 
makes them amenable to the public and thus gain popular support for them. Others posit 
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that public opinion has the power to influence policy, either by audiences punishing 
foreign policy failures and rewarding successes, or by having leaders select foreign 
policies in anticipation of public opinion. Previous research supports both points of 
view. 
 On the one hand, research has highlighted the preponderant role elites play in 
framing national involvement in international affairs, particularly in times of 
international crises. These theories emphasize the process via which individuals learn 
about the implementation of coercive foreign policies. Unlike other policy arenas in 
which individuals have access to different information sources, foreign policy is an area 
in which they necessarily ‘hold the short end of the stick’ information-wise, at least in 
the initial stages of intervention (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Iyengar 
and Simon 1993; Baum 2004b; Baum and Potter 2008; but see Baum 2002; Aldrich, 
Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006; Baum and Groeling 2010). Individuals learn 
about the costs associated with coercive foreign policies in a highly politicized domestic 
context. Communicating issues necessarily involves frames; otherwise, people would 
turn on their television sets and see nothing but raw data. Framing implies “that leaders 
introduce organizing themes into the policy debate that affect how the public views a 
political issue” (Geva, Astorino-Courtois and Mintz 1996:361). Governments can 
influence media frames in an attempt to draw popular support for their policy objectives 
(Mermin 1997; Robinson 2000; Entman 2003; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; but see 
Roberts 1993; Mandelbaum 1996). Some have posited that elite framing can push voters 
to support certain policies by changing their attitudes even if their underlying beliefs 
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remain intact (Boettcher and Cobb 2009:682). Others have taken matters further, stating 
that the U.S. executive “lead members of the public to assume false beliefs in support of 
his position” (Kull, Ramsay and Lewis 2004: 596) during the Iraq war.  
 However, there is a limit to the effect elite framing can have on domestic 
audiences. Boettcher and Cobb (2009) conclude that only those initially willing to 
support military intervention in Iraq became more willing to incur increasing casualties 
when elites framed these as investments. Long-lasting ties like partisanship can 
outweigh the effects new information about casualties or the achievement of wartime 
goals can have on individuals’ support for war, regardless of how they are framed 
(Berinsky 2007). Jordan and Page (1992) find that only popular presidents can sway the 
public into supporting their foreign policies.  
On the other hand, numerous studies support the notion that the casual arrow can 
be reversed: the public does influence policy-making. Baum and Potter (2008) note that 
scholars have recently begun to consider public opinion as a constraint for foreign policy 
that politicians need to consider. Studies have shown that candidates who campaign on 
foreign policy issues can gain votes by representing popular preferences. Aldrich, 
Sullivan and Borgida (1989) show that foreign policy issues had a significant effect on 
more than half the U.S. Presidential elections between 1952 and 1984. Bartels (1991) 
finds that public opinion has a significant effect on a broad array of national defense 
spending matters. Page and Shapiro (1983) show that 62% of the time public opinion has 
an effect on subsequent changes in foreign policy. Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and 
Sharp (2006) claim that people’s foreign policy preferences influence how they vote in 
 13 
 
democratic elections, and this forces policy-makers to take into account how the public 
will react to proposed foreign policies before implementing them. Evidence of foreign 
policies affecting Presidential approval and vote choice in Presidential elections was 
found after the American bombing of Libya in 1986 (Peffley, Langley and Goidel 1995) 
and during the Iraq war (Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007; Campbell 2004; Karol and 
Miguel 2007).  
Exactly how might public foreign policy preferences constrain actual policies? 
One option has been proposed by Nincic and Hinckley (1991). They study the 
discrepancy between political science theories, which posit that foreign policy stances do 
not affect vote choice, and the empirical regularity that candidates do devote 
considerable time and effort to making their foreign policy preferences known (with 
speeches and also by seemingly timing foreign policy actions right before an election) 
(Nincic 1990). They suggest a two-step process through which public preferences and 
democratic candidates’ foreign policy stances affect voting behavior. In the first step, 
“the voters’ evaluations of a candidate’s performance or position on external affairs 
influence the overall impression that the public has of the candidate. In a second stage, 
the voters’ electoral decisions are guided by the overall impression, even if a direct link 
between policies and vote is not easily established8” (1991: 335). This two-stage process 
would explain why previous studies have failed to find a direct link between foreign 
policy stances and vote choice.  
                                                 
8
 Italics in the original text.  
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Some evidence supports the constraining effect public opinion can have on 
coercive foreign policies. Public opinion can influence when interventionist policies are 
implemented (Sobel 2001). As noted by Baum in the Somalia crisis, preoccupation with 
a possible public backlash prior to the presidential election “inhibited President Bush 
from launching a large-scale U.S. intervention prior to November 1992, while reduced 
public scrutiny after the November election removed this important barrier to 
intervention” (2004b: 189). Nincic (1988), Russet (1990), and Trager and Vavreck 
(2011) find that public opinion can help keep coercive foreign policies in balance 
because domestic audiences prefer hawkish policies when the executive is dovish and 
conservative ones when the President is a liberal (and vice-versa). For Aldrich, Gelpi, 
Feaver, Reifler and Sharp (2006), the way foreign policy was conducted in Lebanon and 
Somalia shows that, “the elite perception of public opinion can have a profound impact 
on foreign policy. The widespread assumption of public casualty aversion that flowed 
from these experiences also shaped American foreign policy in Rwanda, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo” (2006: 492).  
Finding conclusive evidence of public opinion preceding and actually influencing 
foreign policy is no easy task. While analyzing studies addressing President Reagan’s 
covert intervention in Nicaragua, Holsti (1992) notes that foreign policy elites tried to 
foment public support for an intervention aimed at aiding the rebels, but such efforts 
were unsuccessful (Sobel 1989). He asks, “would the Reagan administration have 
intervened more directly or more massively in Nicaragua or El Salvador in the absence 
of such attitudes?” (1992: 453). Analyses of counterfactuals can of course not provide 
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robust evidence of public opinion influencing whether foreign policy actions are carried 
out covertly or overtly. However, such an analyses seems logically plausible.   
Before concluding this section I must note that some scholars of international 
relations posit that no relationship exists between public foreign policy preferences and 
elections or actual foreign policy decisions.9 Evidence exists supporting the notion that 
public opinion has no effect in constraining foreign policy (Lipset 1966; Cohen 1973; 
LaFeber 1977; Levering 1978; Paterson 1979; Graebner 1983; Holsti 1992). Miller and 
Stokes (1963) find that although public opinion influenced Congress’s civil rights 
positions, a comparable effect of public foreign policy preferences was lacking. Others 
find that foreign policy preferences affect vote choice only when foreign affairs have 
unusually prevalent domestic effects (Hess and Nelson 1985). Arena (2008) argues that 
the role of democratic accountability in military foreign policies has been overstated, as 
leaders will only be held accountable when domestic political opposition exists. Jacobs 
and Page (2005) question previous research linking public opinion and foreign policy by 
noting that, “in our analyses, a very strong bivariate relationship between public opinion 
and the preferences of policy makers crumbled away almost completely when we 
included data on organized interests and experts in multivariate regressions” (2005: 
121).  
 
 
                                                 
9
 For realists and neorealists responsiveness to public opinion should normatively be avoided as it can be 
detrimental for national security (Lippmann 1955; Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006; Jacobs 
and Shapiro 1999). 
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1.4. Executive Approval and Accountability in Democracies  
Accountability refers to the link between constituents (their preferences) and 
their representatives (their actions). Accountability mechanisms present in democracies 
imply that political leaders who act in ways that do not represent constituents’ 
preferences can be punished. How exactly do domestic audiences punish leaders? 
Traditionally, international relations theories have focused on the most dramatic form of 
punishment –voting a leader out of office (Anderson 2007).10 However, recent empirical 
studies have lowered this threshold, both for punishing democratic leaders in general, as 
well as for the particular case of audience costs. Any substantive decline in executive 
approval can constitute a case of a leader being punished. Snyder and Borghard (2011) 
note that a substantive decline in executive approval generated by a leader backing down 
from a threat can undermine her political effectiveness and consequently should count as 
a case of audience costs. Voeten and Brewer (2006) also believe that approval ratings are 
important beyond elections in their study of the Iraq war. They highlight that democratic 
executives require public support not only to begin a war but also to continue fighting it.  
Quantitative studies have demonstrated that a significant correlation exists 
between approval for an incumbent executive and her share of the presidential vote 
(Sigelman 1979) and also between executive approval and votes for the incumbent’s 
political party (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1982; Brody and Sigelman 1983; Nincic and 
Hinckley 1991). Nincic and Hinckley find that, “for every 2% increase in a president’s 
approval, one can expect a nearly 1% increase in the presidential vote” (1991:337).  
                                                 
10
 I must note that accountability in studies of comparative politics usually refers to continuous political 
representation, not being reduced to elections (Taylor-Robinson 2010).  
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In this study, I measure executive approval and assume a decline in approval for 
the executive indicates that domestic audiences are punishing their leader. Assuming that 
an increase in executive approval corresponds with heightened popular support and that 
a decrease in approval is equivalent to punishing the executive (or to holding her 
accountable) has become customary in experimental studies of audience costs (Tomz 
2007; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). 
 
1.5. Addressing Recent Audience Costs Critiques  
Audience costs constitute an important element of many theories of 
accountability in international relations. A vast literature has highlighted that democratic 
leaders have a bargaining advantage in international crises because when they make a 
military threat it is credible as backing down can trigger a loss of domestic support 
denominated audience costs. In the words of Downes and Sechser, audience costs are 
“one of the most widely accepted theoretical propositions in international relations 
scholarship” (2012:41). However, the concept has recently been the target of serious 
critiques issued by prominent scholars of international relations.  
Downes and Sechser (2012) claim that audience costs theory has been 
predominantly tested with data that is inadequate for such purpose. A disconnect has 
occurred because a theory about the effects of international threats has been principally 
tested with the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) and the International Crisis 
Behavior (ICB) datasets. According to their estimations, inter-state threats constitute 
approximately 9% of the MID data and 15% of the ICB data (2012:13). They correctly 
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note that, “to test audience cost theory, one therefore needs a dataset of coercive threats 
so that threats issued by democracies and non-democracies can be compared. While this 
may seem obvious, it actually implies that many high-profile international conflicts 
should be excluded when testing the theory” (2012:5). Examples of international 
episodes that were not preceded by demands include high-stakes conflicts such as North 
Korea invading South Korea in 1950, as well as countless low-level cross-border raids 
and minor troop movements. They highlight that, “hypotheses about the outcomes of 
threats cannot be evaluated with historical events in which no threats were issued” 
(2012:5). They replicate influential analyses conducted by Schultz (2001) and Gelpi and 
Griesdorf (2001) with a new dataset of 194 interstate compellent threats issued between 
1918 and 2001. Results do not support audience costs theory. 
They conclude their study by asking, “If voters do indeed frown upon democratic 
leaders who renege on threats, as several studies have found (Tomz 2007; Levendusky 
and Horowitz 2102), why do they not appear to make democratic threats more 
effective?” (2012:41). They list several possible answers to this puzzle, suggesting that 
perhaps audience costs are not unique to democracies or that audience costs can be 
minimized by employing certain elite frames (as Levendusky and Horowitz 2012 
effectively confirm). My dissertation answers this puzzle differently: I propose that 
audience costs are alive and well but predict they will only operate when leaders’ threats 
represent the foreign policy preferences of their constituents.  
Other scholars have posited similar arguments, most recently Trachtenberg 
(2012) and Snyder and Borghard (2011). These authors highlight the importance of 
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considering that audience costs might or might not be paid depending on other domestic 
considerations and illustrate their claims using case studies. Trachtenberg notes that 
there is at least one clear historical case in which domestic audiences would have 
punished their governments for not backing down on a threat. Given the general 
reluctance of Europeans to risk going to war, if the French and the British governments 
would have followed through on threats to take action against Germany if Hitler 
remilitarized the Rhineland in March of 1936, they would have probably lost upcoming 
elections (2012:47).   
Snyder and Borghard (2011) claim that audience costs are rare among other 
things because “domestic audiences understandably care more about policy substance 
than about consistency between the leader’s words and deeds. Where these criteria are in 
conflict, punishment is more likely to be doled out for an unpopular policy than for a 
failure to carry out a threat” (2011:455). They claim that, “audience costs are most likely 
to arise as a second-order complication when public opinion already has hawkish 
preferences and pushes the democratic leader to make a committing threat” (2011:452-
3). 
I complement these findings with the research presented in this dissertation. I 
provide a theory that specifies when domestic audiences will prefer economic or military 
coercion and posit that we can predict when audience costs will be paid by examining 
the salience of an international crises and popular expectations for national action. I 
conduct the first experimental test of a proposition that integrates public preferences and 
reactions to executive inconsistency in democracies. The following section presents my 
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theoretical framework and the hypotheses derived from it that I tested nationally and 
cross-nationally.  
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2. THEORY 
 
 
In this section I present my theoretical framework, the assumptions it builds on, 
and the hypotheses derived from it. These assumptions are grounded on existing 
literature. Therefore, before describing my framework, I present three brief literature 
reviews. These reviews show that public foreign policy preferences and the reactions of 
domestic audiences to executive inconsistency play a role in democratic accountability. 
The first review summarizes work on domestic accountability that examines the 
representation of constituents’ policy preferences in military confrontations. The second 
review also addresses how constituents’ preferences influence international affairs, but 
this time regarding supporting or opposing economic coercion. The third literature 
review describes the international relations literature that posits that citizens prefer 
consistent leaders and make inconsistent ones pay audience costs. After concluding this 
review, I present my theoretical framework.  
My framework includes two sets of novel hypotheses derived from my theory as 
well as one hypothesis that replicates of Tomz’s 2007 audience costs argument. My 
framework provides a general explanation of public support (or lack thereof) in times of 
international crises by focusing on the interaction that occurs between public policy 
preferences and the executive’s consistent or inconsistent actions. Before evaluating the 
interaction that occurs between these variables I will assess the role of each one 
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individually both here as well as in the subsequent empirical sections. This is the reason 
why I include a replication of Tomz’s hypothesis.  
 The theoretical problem this dissertation addresses is the lack of consensus that 
exists in the field regarding the specific role constituents’ preferences can potentially 
play in fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies. The 
objective of the theory presented here is to specify the role public policy preferences and 
executive inconsistencies play in democratic accountability regarding coercive foreign 
policies. That is, I seek to examine under what conditions domestic audiences will 
reward or punish democratic leaders for their foreign policy behavior in times of 
international crises. To answer this question I first theorize about what affects public 
preferences for military and economic coercion. I then examine how these policy 
preferences influence when approval for democratic leaders will increase or decrease for 
not following through on threats of military or economic coercion.  
My theory is a parsimonious alternative to previous theories of accountability 
because it is not constrained to salient crises (as theories of audience costs inherently 
are) or to cases of military or economic coercion. It constitutes one of the first systematic 
attempts to examine public preferences for two common types of policies enacted in 
times of international crises: military interventions and economic sanctions. My theory 
thereby addresses current criticisms of the audience costs concept (Trachtenberg 2012; 
Synder and Borghard 2011). These criticisms question the usefulness of a concept that 
ignores how the compatibility between public preferences and the coercive threats made 
by the executive can influence when executive inconsistency will be punished.  
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The theory presented here brings together theories of accountability that focus on 
the public’s policy preferences and theories of audience costs. In doing so, I expand the 
applicability of the concept of audience costs to cases of economic coercion. My unique 
contribution is to present a theory that predicts when domestic audiences will prefer 
economic or military coercion and when audience costs will be paid or avoided 
following executive inconsistency in these policy domains.  
 
2.1. Literature Review 
2.1.1. The Public’s Policy Preferences in Military Interventions 
The realist paradigm, in which states were the primary unit of analysis, has given 
way to a growing scholarly focus on the influences of domestic political factors on the 
onset and duration of international conflict. Most international relations research 
examining the causes of war and peace currently include variables assessing domestic 
factors such as regime type, political institutions and popular preferences. Scholars 
initially developed diversionary theory models according to which unpopular leaders 
would initiate inter-state conflicts in order to increase their popularity at home (the so-
called ‘rally-around-the-flag’ phenomenon). “The literature suggests that leaders adopt 
scapegoating as a rational instrument of policy to advance their interests, while publics 
respond on the basis of symbolic and emotional appeals, as explained by the in-
group/out-group hypothesis” (Levy 1998:155). Empirical support for these theories has 
been mixed (Levy 1998; Chiozza and Goemans 2003).  
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Scholars have studied whether democratic accountability mechanisms like 
elections provide leaders with a motivation to act in accordance to constituents’ interests. 
When a political leader is acting in a way that does not reflect the preferences of those 
she supposedly represents, domestic constituents can hold her accountable and 
potentially vote her out of office (Anderson 2007). Scholars in this group focus on the 
effects political regime type could have in fomenting or constraining the initiation of 
warfare (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson 
and Smith 1999). It has been posited that democratic leaders, due to their motivation to 
remain in office, enact foreign policies (including waging war) that they anticipate broad 
sectors of the population will support.  
 While Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators focus on the effects institutional 
elements have on the onset of military conflict, other scholars interested in the 
accountability constraints present in democracies have underlined the importance of 
normative factors. These arguments can be traced to Kant and claim that “political 
culture [democratic] and political norms constitute images that a state transmits to its 
external environment” (Maoz and Russett 1993:625). These models assume that 
democratic values, such as tolerance and a high regard for peace, inhibit the escalation of 
crises between pairs of democratic nations into full-fledged warfare. Observational 
empirical studies support both the role of normative and institutional factors in 
preventing war in democratic dyads (Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal, Russett and 
Berbaum 2003).  
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Scholars have also studied the public’s tendency to prefer supporting specific 
military objectives. Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton’s (1998) theory 
highlights how domestic audiences have a tendency to prefer supporting certain types of 
military interventions while opposing others, thus offering a comprehensive theory of 
citizen reaction in times of armed conflict. In their model, public support for U.S. 
military interventions abroad is influenced by the principal policy objective for which 
military might is being employed. They pose that humanitarian interventions (designed 
to provide relief after widespread disasters, such as the U.S. intervention in Somalia) and 
foreign policy restraint objectives (designed to coerce an opponent who was aggressively 
acting against U.S. national interests or citizens –e.g. most Cold War era interventions) 
receive higher levels of support than military action seeking internal political change. 
However, they posit that for every crisis the principal policy objective will not 
monotonically affect public opinion, highlighting how audiences and leaders interact. In 
his 1992 paper (before humanitarian interventions were added as a foreign policy 
objective), Jentleson comments that, “Public support will not necessarily just be there; it 
must be cultivated and evoked through effective presidential leadership. But this evoking 
is far more likely to succeed when the principal policy objective is foreign policy 
restraint, even in the face of significant risks” (1992:71).  
 Research that examines the effects of specific popular preferences on state 
behavior in ongoing disputes also includes Koch and Sullivan (2010) and Huth and Alle 
(2002). Koch and Sullivan focus on how institutional settings within democracies can 
affect political leaders’ decision to end a military conflict. Democratic citizens are 
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generally considered as being casualty adverse, and empirical evidence tends to support 
this claim (Nincic and Nincic 1995; Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997; Gartner, 
Segura and Barratt 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Koch and Gartner 2005; Karol 
and Miguel 2007; Kriner and Shen 2007; Gartner 2008). Others have stated that while 
democratic citizens are casualty adverse, how preponderant this preference will be in 
determining support for military interventions is conditioned by policy objectives being 
met (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005). The question for Koch and Gartner (2005) 
becomes under which circumstances institutional arrangements, such as district 
separation and the number of political parties, affect legislators’ actions in anticipation 
of being held accountable by constituents if they fail to oppose a costly war.  
 Huth and Alle’s (2002) political accountability model is unique in that they 
consider specific crises in which domestic audiences’ preferences could actually push 
democratic leaders into war. They claim that, in ethnic conflicts, “democratic leaders 
will face particularly strong pressures from domestic opposition groups and public 
opinion to take forceful initiatives to challenge the status quo and support their ethnic 
conationals” (2002:761). They later add that, “for democratic leaders, the domestic 
political costs of diplomatic and military inaction in such circumstances are greater, and 
thus they are actually more likely to consider initiating and escalating military threats 
and to adopt unyielding positions in negotiations” (2002:762). In my model I build upon 
this notion of the public’s expectations playing a primordial role in motivating 
democratic representatives into coercive foreign policy options and therefore in the onset 
of armed conflict.  
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Thus far accountability theories regarding audience’s policy preferences have 
generally been tested with observational empirical analyzes.11 Research has focused 
primarily on studying the behavior of nation-states and individual leaders. What is 
missing is an examination of when constituents will prefer specific coercive policy 
options such as military action or the imposition of economic sanctions in times of 
international crises. I now discuss the role domestic support for economic sanctions can 
play in fomenting or constraining the implementation of economic coercion.  
 
2.1.2. The Public’s Policy Preferences in Economic Coercion  
Economic sanctions are defined as a foreign policy action that seeks “to lower 
the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order 
to coerce the target government to change its political behavior” (Pape 1997:93-4). The 
puzzle regarding economic sanctions is that their use has risen exponentially since 
World War I (Bienen and Gilpin 1980; Pape 1997; Drury 2001) while a growing 
consensus in the international relations literature is that they are not effective in 
modifying state behavior (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg 2008; Pape 1997). 
According to Pape, “sanctions have been successful less than 5 percent of the time” 
(1997:106).  
 Scholars have solved this puzzle by shifting their attention from whether 
economic sanctions are instrumentally effective (that is, do they achieve policy changes 
in the target state) to whether they provide some other positive benefit for the leaders 
                                                 
11
 A noteworthy exemption is Gartner (2008), who experimentally examines the role of mounting 
casualties in public support for armed conflict. 
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enacting them. One such benefit is the symbolic function of sanctions (Galtung 1967; 
Barber 1979; Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Nincic and Wallensteen 1983; Eland 1995; 
Whang 2011). According to this view, the imposition of economic sanctions functions as 
a signal of disapproval for policies being carried out by the target state. Economic 
sanctions are thus frequently employed when target states are engaging in policies that 
general audiences in the sender state might dislike and disapprove of.  
Sanction signals can be aimed at either international or domestic audiences. As 
noted by Dorussen and Mo, “sanctions are at the same time tools in international 
bargaining and part of domestic politics” (2001:396). Whang (2011) studies how 
domestic audiences react to sanction signals and finds that, “the initiation of sanctions 
tends to improve future public opinion regarding the incumbent leader’s job 
performance. On average, the imposition of sanctions tends to result in a 3.301% 
increase in the approval rating in the following month” (2011:18).  
Audiences can either constrain or compel state leaders to employ economic 
sanctions. An example of the latter is when “there have been public outcries for action, 
one of the most notable being the demand for harsher economic sanctions against 
apartheid South Africa” (Drury 2001:490). When domestic audiences have such clear 
preferences, more likely than not it will be in the interest of national leaders to act 
accordingly, particularly democratic ones. “Democratic leaders know they hold a 
precarious and competitive position, requiring constant effort to curry public favor” 
(Allen 2005:118).  
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For Allen (2005) both military and economic foreign policy actions are two-level 
games in which domestic constraints influence the behavior of state leaders at the 
international level. She applies the bargaining dynamics commonly employed in the 
militarized literature to better understand inter-state behavior regarding economic 
sanctions. Two or more actors are disputing a given good, which can be a tangible good 
such as territory or an intangible one such as a policy, the target state has enacted that 
the sender state disapproves of. Although each actor would prefer to avoid the costs 
associated with economic sanctions, if these are imposed it is because the sender state 
believes her opponent will have to pay higher costs than she and will therefore yield to 
her demands regarding the distribution of the disputed good. If this is the case and the 
opponent yields, the use of economic sanctions was successful. However, if this does not 
occur and after a determined period of time the sender state decides she is no longer 
willing to pay the costs she herself is paying by imposing sanctions, these will be lifted 
and their use would be considered a failure. For Allen the key determinant that leads to a 
successful or a failed outcome relates to the domestic politics of both the sender and the 
target states. Regarding the sender state, domestic accountability links between the 
executive and those she represents determine when economic sanctions are to be lifted: 
“leadership change in the sender state will increase the likelihood that sanctions will end 
in concession by the sender state. New leaders want to choose policies that will enhance 
their ability to stay in power. Those policies should be in line with their supporters. A 
different coalition of supporters will likely support different policies” (2005:126).  
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Thus, accountability mechanisms can play an important role in the termination of 
economic sanctions that have already been enacted. According to Drury (2001), 
domestic factors also influence the decision to implement these sanctions: The president 
seems to prefer starting a sanctioning policy when his approval is high. Since sanctions 
can have a negative effect, especially on business trading with the target country, the 
president will be more at ease employing them when he has the political capacity to 
withstand a domestic backlash (2001:504). 
Economic sanctions may not only increase presidential approval ratings, they 
may also decrease them. Dorussen and Mo (2001) claim that accountability mechanisms 
can contribute to make economic sanctions a more useful bargaining tool. Since 
democratic leaders have to respond to domestic institutions, it will not be in their best 
interest to impose sanctions in the international arena (which will necessarily have 
domestic effects) without due consideration of the effects these sanctions will have at 
home. The two-level game democratic leaders are engaged in therefore implies that they 
will only commit to imposing sanctions when they are relatively certain they will stick to 
them for a determined period of time. Ending sanctions is a bargaining situation where 
actors, “have taken actions that partially commit them to a bargaining position. Audience 
costs can make revoking the commitment costly […] given the audience costs, the 
sender prefers to remain with sanctions for domestic reasons as long as the target refuses 
to yield sufficiently on the disputed policy” (2001:403). 
When scholars of economic coercion use the term ‘audience costs’ they are 
frequently not referring to the same phenomena described in studies of militarized 
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disputes. In military literature the term is used to describe domestic dynamics that occur 
at a threat level, whereas in studies of economic sanctions it is usually employed to 
describe domestic political costs a leader may pay when lifting sanctions that have 
actually been implemented. One notable exception is Martin (1993). She highlights the 
role audience costs play when a state is imposing sanctions and wishes to encourage 
other states to cooperate by imposing sanctions against the same target. She notes that, 
“one mechanism by which the leading sender can establish a commitment involves 
increasing the audience costs that it will bear for reneging on their threats or promises. 
The leading sender can increase audience costs on either domestic or international level 
by building a collation in support of stringent sanctions” (1993: 431).  
Before concluding this section, I must mention that some authors have warned 
against the potential pitfalls of studying the effects of economic sanctions employing 
natural variance data. Lacy and Niou (2004) point out that studies of sanctions that 
examine the cases in which these were actually implemented are omitting the most 
successful cases in which the threat of sanctions was enough to modify the policies of 
another state. “Economic sanctions are likely to be imposed when they are not likely to 
succeed in changing the target’s behavior. Sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so 
at the mere threat of sanctions” (2004:25).  
In sum, international scholars have addressed how democratic leaders employing 
economic sanctions will likely consider the preferences of their domestic audiences 
before implementing sanctions, as well as when considering terminating them. They 
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have also made theoretical distinctions between the actual implementation of sanctions 
and the threat to use them.  
  
2.1.3. The Public’s Preference for Consistent Leaders in Military Interventions 
International relations scholars have proposed that at an international level 
leaders engaging in pre-war bargaining processes have incentives to appear highly 
resolved about not backing down if their claims are not met. Both strong and weak types 
of states will be motivated to signal to their opponent that they are strong, that is, that 
engaging in war is not excessively costly for them and that they are resolved to follow 
through (Fearon 1995). This motivates them to publicly commit to harsh courses of 
action, including waging war, if their opponent does not yield. Committing publicly 
makes leader’s threats credible because international opponents know that when a 
politician breaks a public promise she faces potential backlash at home. This 
accountability link existent in democratic regimes makes their threats more credible than 
the ones made by autocracies.  
Putman’s two-level games and (1988) and Schelling’s nuclear deterrence studies 
(1960, 1966) provided some of the strategic insights Fearon later incorporated into his 
theory. Putman’s logic of two-level games implies that the classical realist/neorealist 
‘state as a unitary actor’ assumption can be abandoned, taking instead strategic 
interactions as the unit of analyses (Lake and Powell 1999). One level of the ‘game’ 
corresponds to international politics, whereas the other corresponds to domestic level 
politics. Understanding that the actions of state leaders occur at both levels implies that 
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behavior that could have previously been labeled as ‘irrational,’ can now be seen as 
beneficial for national representatives. As noted by Putnam, “the unusual complexity of 
this two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one board (such as 
raising energy prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto imports) may be impolitic for 
that same player at the other board” (1988:434).  
Schelling set out to explain how weapons as deadly as nuclear ones could be 
used in international confrontations. Nuclear threats are hardly credible when one’s 
opponent also has nuclear capacity, for mutual annihilation is at stake. Schelling’s 
revolutionary work tackled how to make a credible threat out of an incredible one. 
Counter-intuitively, he advocated limiting the number of actions one’s nation could 
incur in. This would make it clear to the opponent that the bargaining range no longer 
included their preferred sets of outcomes. The arsenal of ways in which options could be 
surrendered included making executive public commitments that could “tie one’s hands” 
at the negotiating table. This consists of creating “a bargaining position by public 
statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no concessions 
to be made. If a binding public opinion can be cultivated and made evident to the other 
side, the initial position can thereby be made visibly ‘final’” (1960:28).   
International relations scholars have conducted formal (Fearon 1997; Smith 
1998; Guisinger and Smith 2002) and observational empirical studies (Partell and 
Palmer 1999; Schultz 1999, 2001; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001; Eyerman and Hart 1996; 
Gaubatz 1996) highlighting the beneficial positions democratic states would have 
relative to autocratic ones when it comes to credibly signaling resolve in an international 
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dispute. Experimental studies assessing the effects of executive inconsistency on 
presidential approval ratings have also been employed. Tomz’s (2007) experiment 
demonstrates that democratic constituents punish their leaders for backing down mostly 
out of concern for national reputation, as well as for the personal credibility of their 
leader abroad. Trager and Vavreck (2011) find that even when experimental participants 
learn that U.S. involvement in an inter-state war yielded 4,000 military casualties and 
furthermore, that the U.S. did not achieve the objective that motivated it to intervene in 
the first place, audiences will punish backing down in the pre-war stage. In their 
experiment the president’s approval rating after fighting an unsuccessful war stays at 
40%, whereas the ratings of a president that publicly commits to war then backs down 
plummet to 24%. Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) focus on domestic factors, 
examining the effects partisanship, partisan elites and executive justifications have on 
“audience costs.” They find that inconsistency is not punished when the action is framed 
as being a consequence of new information and backing down is presented as being in 
the national interest.  
Clare (2007) and Baum (2004a) have underscored the importance the salience of 
a conflict has in determining whether a leader will pay audience costs for being 
inconsistent. Clare posits that the public will only punish inconsistent leaders when an 
international conflict is salient enough and tests his theory by observing whether intra-
dyad threat reciprocation took place in salient and non-salient crises (he does not include 
any measure of public opinion). For Baum the president determines if a crisis is salient. 
He advises executives to avoid making an international issue salient by issuing a foreign 
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policy threat that would make otherwise inattentive audiences pay attention to a crisis 
they would have otherwise ignored. If the president avoids making a crisis salient, 
audience costs can be avoided were the executive to back down after delivering a threat. 
Executives will almost certainly have more to lose than to gain by making international 
threats as audiences tend to assume presidents know how to conduct foreign policy. 
They can either display competency people a-priori assumed they had or destroy that 
competent image. Baum concludes that U.S. presidents will generally only benefit by 
“going public” and making their military intervention intentions known when significant 
national interests are at stake in an international conflict (as does Clare 2007). 
Otherwise, U.S. leaders will have more to lose than to gain by publicly committing to a 
course of action.  
Although presidential statements can undoubtedly increase an issue’s saliency, 
and at times effectively trigger public attentiveness, my framework is more in line with 
the current debate regarding the so-called “CNN effect.”12 The “CNN effect” states that 
although governmental signals are very important for citizens, media outlets can also 
motivate individuals to follow a given conflict attentively. I relax the assumption that 
audiences rely exclusively on executive cues, which allows domestic audiences to have 
expectations regarding national foreign policy without being cued by the executive 
(Slantchev 2006).   
                                                 
12
 Researchers that study the relationship between media exposure of humanitarian crises and foreign 
policy interventions use the label  ‘CNN effect’ to refer to cases in which “emotive news coverage of 
suffering people appeared to drive intervention” (Robinson 2000:613). 
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In sum, existing literature suggests that public preferences exist regarding both 
military action and the imposition of economic sanctions. These preferences can play an 
important role in constraining or fomenting the implementation of these coercive foreign 
policies.  Additionally, we know that executive inconsistency matters. Its effect on 
domestic support has been studied primarily in military disputes and has been limited to 
salient crises.  
What is missing regarding public preferences in military and economic coercion 
is predicting when audiences will support the implementation of these policies, as well 
as specifying how these preferences influence the effect acting consistently or 
inconsistently has on support for the executive. Public policy preferences are not static; 
they vary according to how salient domestic audiences perceive an international crisis to 
be. The theory I present here specifies the effect the perceived salience of an 
international crisis has in determining public preferences and predicts how these 
preferences will affect support for democratic executives. By identifying how public 
policy preferences and preferences for consistent executives interact in times of 
international crises I am contributing to accountability research.  
 
2.2. A Framework of Domestic Accountability in International Relations 
2.2.1. Assumptions 
Accountability refers to the link between constituents’ preferences and the 
actions of their representatives (Anderson 2007). This is the focus of my theory. Similar 
to the theories presented in the literature review above, my theory rejects the 
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realist/neorealist assumption that states are unitary actors. Instead, my theory rests on 
two assumptions pertaining to the connection that exists between public opinion and 
foreign policies in democracies. These assumptions are as follows:  
 
 (A) Public Preferences play a role in the Foreign Policies of Democratic States. 
Previous studies have shown that members of the public have preferences, and that these 
preferences can affect how leaders conduct foreign policy. As evidenced in the literature 
review, public preferences for military and economic coercion, as well as for consistent 
leaders, can play an important role in democracies. Although there is no consensus 
regarding the extent to which democratic leaders consider public opinion when 
designing and implementing policies, research in the field suggests this assumption is a 
tenable one to make.  
 
(B) Executive Approval Matters in Democracies. Executive approval matters due to the 
accountability mechanisms present in democracies. I assume that executive approval 
matters in democracies, even beyond elections. I assume that democratic leaders care 
about approval lasting through their tenure in office, as it facilitates dealings with 
Congress and can help keep strong challengers at bay. Research in the field suggests this 
assumption is a tenable one to make, as endogenous models of international relations 
find that constituents can decrease approval for an executive over a broad array of 
policies.  
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2.2.2. Theory 
The objective of the theory presented here is to specify the role constituents’ 
preferences can potentially play in fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in 
democracies. My theory builds on the assumptions presented above. If one assumes that 
public preferences play a role in the foreign policies of democratic states we can 
investigate what influences preferences for coercive foreign policies in times of 
international crises. In my first hypothesis (presented below) I propose that the perceived 
salience of an international crisis will determine public policy preferences. In turn, these 
public preferences will affect support for democratic executives in times of crises.  
Regarding my second assumption, if one assumes that executive approval matters 
beyond immediate elections, it becomes necessary to examine how approval can 
increase or decrease in times as trying as international crises. In democracies 
accountability mechanisms such as elections imply that citizens’ approval or disapproval 
of the executive plays an important role. The third set of hypotheses presented here 
specifies how public policy preferences will affect whether executive inconsistency 
leads to a drop in executive approval in times of crises.  
  
2.2.2.1. The Role of Salience  
The public’s general preference for active executives that issue threats is 
qualified by an important factor: the salience of the international crisis at hand. I propose 
that the salience of an international crisis will determine domestic audiences’ preferences 
for national action. The importance of the saliency of international events has been 
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previously noted in the audience costs literature (Baum 2004a, Clare 2007). However, 
the field lacks a shared definition clarifying what constitutes a salient crisis. Most 
scholars of international relations do not provide a conceptual definition of the term in 
their work, even when it is pivotal to their theories, as is the case of Baum (2004a) and 
Clare (2007).  
I define an international crisis as salient when it threatens national security. 
Ullman provides a definition of a national security threat that highlights the effects such 
a threat will have at an individual-level. His definition of a national security threat, 
which emphasizes the ability of an event to affect the lives of individuals, is appropriate 
for this study as I am focusing on individual-level reactions to foreign policy matters. 
Ullman defines a national security threat as, “an action or a sequence of events that (1) 
threatens drastically and over a relatively brief period of time to degrade the quality of 
life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of 
policy choices available to a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, 
groups, corporations) within the state” (1983:133).13 In my framework, domestic 
audiences will consider an inter-state crisis that takes place abroad as salient when 
national security or economic interests are threatened.14 
                                                 
13
 This is only one of many different definitions of national security threats. As noted by Levy, the term is 
“flexible enough to mean almost anything one wishes” (1995:37). Many definitions are narrower. 
Haftendorn for instance, limits her definition to military threats or to the possibility of a nation being 
overthrown or attacked (1991). Although Ullman’s definition is not regularly used in mainstream security 
studies (Levy 1995), it has been employed in studies that examine the links between security and broader 
issues such as the environment (Gleick 1991; Homer-Dixon 1991; Myers 1993; Romm 1993).  
14
 As noted in the “Introduction to Empirics” section, the experiments conducted with student samples in 
the U.S. and the U.K. mention that national economic and security interests are at stake in salient crises 
(following Tomz 2007). The experiment conducted with the representative sample of American adults 
does not mention a threat to the national economy in salient scenarios. I believe this new manipulation 
improved the experiment even if it differs from previous experiments of audience costs. As noted by a 
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 Unless an international crisis directly threatens a state’s territory, there is often a 
considerable divergence of opinion regarding the extent to which a crisis presents a 
threat to the nation’s security. Variation can be the result of how broadly individuals 
construe the notion of national security; for example it is increasingly common to hear 
environmental or resource issues defined as matters of national security (Ullman 1983, 
Levy 1995). Leaders and political elites can influence media frames in an attempt to 
draw popular support for their policy objectives (Mermin 1997; Robinson 2000; Entman 
2003; Kull, Ramsay and Lewis 2004; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Boettcher and Cobb 
2009; Perla 2011; but see Roberts 1993; Mandelbaum 1996). What both of these factors 
highlight is the fundamentally perceptual nature of salience. There is no single, shared 
concept of national interest, or of what makes an issue or a crisis event salient. Rather, 
individuals’ prior beliefs, combined with the framing of an issue by leaders and the 
media, play a role in determining whether a crisis will be perceived as salient or not.  
 While questions of how individuals perceive national security, or determine the 
salience of international crises are intriguing, they do not pertain to my theory. My 
theory focuses on whether the public will support the executive or indicate they 
disapprove of her performance in the context of a crisis perceived by them as either 
salient or not salient. That is, my theory applies to cases where the salience of a crisis 
has already been determined. The salience of a crisis affects whether individuals feel 
threatened. This state has both emotional and cognitive implications. Emotionally, 
individuals will be more likely to prefer policies they would have not preferred in 
                                                                                                                                                
committee member, confounding a threat to national security with a threat to national economic interests 
was problematic as they could work in opposite directions.   
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absence of a threat if they feel these policies can increase their personal security (Davis 
and Silver 2004). Cognitively, issue salience determines whether an international crisis 
will become prominent to an individual, influencing how much attention is paid to it. 
The more attention we pay to something, the greater influence it will have in our 
judgment (Taylor and Fiske 1975, 1978; Vertzberger 1990; Kunda 1999). Davis and 
Silver (2004) and Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav (2005) find that threat levels can 
make domestic audiences support harsh policies they would otherwise find unacceptable. 
For the specific case of terrorism, they state that, “a heightened sense of threat releases 
people from standing decisions, habits, and ideological predispositions, then people may 
rely less on social norms protective civil liberties and come to favor increased 
governmental efforts to combat terrorism” (2004:30). Thus, when answering the 
question—under which circumstances will domestic audiences reward or penalize 
leaders accountable for foreign policies— it is pivotal to consider how salient a crisis is 
for the public. The salience of a crisis will determine audiences’ preferences for military 
or economic coercion.15  
When an executive acts in a way that does not represent popular preferences, 
executive approval will decrease. Democratic audiences can thus constrain and also 
foment coercive foreign policies. Although the latter has been the subject of little 
empirical research, there is historical evidence of domestic audiences “pushing” their 
                                                 
15
 The scope of this study encompasses the subset of military actions and economic sanctions that are 
publicly announced by the executive and subsequently carried out (or not carried out). This of course does 
not include all military or economic foreign policy actions. For instance, President Reagan’s covert 
funding of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary movement fighting against the communist Sandinistas was 
not publicly announced. 
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representatives into enacting costly foreign policies. President McKinley, for instance, 
felt tremendous popular pressure to go to war with Spain in the 1890s (Levy 1998:152).  
For some scholars, a natural progression of coercive foreign policies exists when 
leaders select actions to carry out against states. This means that leaders will first attempt 
to modify another nation’s behavior by the use of diplomacy, then economic coercion, 
and only begin to consider military intervention if the previous steps have failed 
(Baldwin 1985). I take an alternative approach and consider that foreign policies are not 
considered sequentially. What constitutes an appropriate coercive foreign policy will not 
depend on what previous steps were attempted, but on the salience of a crisis. The public 
can support military measures in the face of international crises that threaten national 
security, even if these actions will be costly in terms of resources and lives lost. When 
facing international crises they perceive as less salient, audiences will prefer leaders to 
engage in less costly foreign policies such as the imposition of economic sanctions. This 
theoretical expectation is summarized in the following hypothesis:  
 
(H1) Preferences for coercive foreign policies are a function of the salience of a crisis. 
In a salient crisis domestic audiences will support taking action –either military or 
economic coercion. In a crisis that is not salient domestic audiences will support 
economic coercion and not military coercion.  
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2.2.2.2. Expanding the Concept of Audience Costs 
The concept of audience costs was created to analyze signaling behavior and has 
been applied primarily to militarized disputes. Its use has been inherently limited to 
crises that are salient. However, the “two-level game” logic behind the concept can be 
applied to non-military inter-state disputes and also to less salient crises. Scholars of 
economic coercion have recently begun to focus on the domestic dynamics associated 
with the imposition of economic sanctions. Some authors have applied the concept of 
audience costs to the economic arena (Martin 1993; Dorussen and Mo 2001). On the 
practical front, as citizens we have witnessed domestic and European leaders threatening 
militarized and economic coercion directed against states that arguably do not pose an 
imminent threat to national security, such as Libya or Syria.16 As has been noted by 
numerous scholars of international relations, the concept of audience costs constitutes a 
useful tool for understanding national action. As part of this study I wish to assess 
whether it can de expanded to cases of economic coercion and also to conflicts that are 
not necessarily salient in order to subsequently examine how executive’s consistent or 
inconsistent behavior interacts with public policy preferences in determining support in 
times of crises.  
 
 (H2) Approval for executives that commit to a course of coercive foreign policy and 
consistently implement it will be higher than that of executives who act inconsistently.  
 
                                                 
16
 Although these nations are significant oil producers, whether domestic turmoil there constitutes a direct 
threat to national security can be questioned.  
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 H2 is not a novel hypothesis but is an expansion of Tomz’s (2007) work. His 
experiments show that audience costs exist in militarized disputes. In this study, I 
expand the concept to cases of economic coercion and to crises that are not salient. 
Directly comparing loss of executive approval after inconsistent behavior in both 
military and economic coercion will clarify if it is the type of foreign policy action, or 
executive inconsistencies in general, that determine whether domestic audiences will 
disapprove of executives that display inconsistent behavior in times of conflict.  
 
2.2.2.3. Interaction between Public Policy Preferences and Executive Inconsistency 
I propose that executive inconsistency will not always lead to a drop in executive 
approval. Even if constituents do not have specific knowledge of foreign affairs, they do 
have general expectations about what their leader should do. Citizens are not blank slates 
reacting to what their representative announces; citizens have a set of expectations their 
representative can fulfill or fail to fulfill. The public might not fully comprehend specific 
foreign policy options such as what constituted a “no fly zone” in Libya, but they do 
have opinions about pursuing coercive action. If the executive publicly commits to a 
foreign policy action and subsequently backs down when domestic audiences did not 
prefer the action that was threatened, audience costs will not necessarily be paid, as 
executive approval might not drop. The effect of consistent/inconsistent behavior on 
executive approval depends on audience’s policy preferences given the salience of a 
crisis.  
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(H3.a) In salient crises, approval for executives that make military or economic threats 
will increase if these are consistently enacted and decrease if the executive is 
inconsistent and backs down.  
 
(H3.b) In crises that are not salient, approval for executives that make economic threats 
will increase if these are consistently enacted and decrease if the executive is 
inconsistent and backs down.  
 
(H3.c) In crises that are not salient, approval for executives that make military threats 
will not decrease if the executive is inconsistent and backs down. 
 
In sum, my theory suggests that, in times of international crises, democratic 
constituents have certain preferences and will support executives who represent them 
when selecting coercive foreign policies. Public preferences are affected by the salience 
of the international crisis at hand. When a crisis is salient, the public will support an 
executive who takes an active role and commits to either military or economic coercion. 
On the other hand, when a crisis is not salient the public is more selective about what 
kind of action they will support, i.e., a less costly policy like imposing sanctions is 
preferred.  
In democracies, domestic audiences will penalize leaders who back down after 
threatening military or economic coercion because they prefer that these actions be 
implemented.  However, when an executive backs down from a threat that did not 
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represent the policy preferences of her constituents, such baking down from military 
action in a non-salient crisis, she will not be penalized. That is, executive inconsistency 
leads to audience costs only when the unfulfilled threat is not in line with the preferences 
of constituents.  
The empirical section that follows describes in detail the procedures via which 
the hypotheses presented here were tested.  
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3. INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICS 
 
 
This section provides a roadmap to the experiments that will be described in the 
following sections. I first address the general strengths and weaknesses of experimental 
methodology in studies of democratic accountability, mentioning the strategies I 
employed to counter the weaknesses of the method. I then present the experiments I 
conducted.  
  
3.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Experiments in Accountability Research  
The main objective of the experiments in this dissertation is to examine the 
specific circumstances under which the public will support leaders in times of 
international conflict or penalize them. Many formal bargaining models currently 
employed in security studies are based on the assumption that audiences hold leaders 
accountable for inconsistent behavior by removing their approval. As in behavioral 
economics, experiments in international relations can prove to be a useful tool through 
which to test the assumptions on which formal accountability models are based (Ostrom 
2000).  
Experiments are especially useful tools in accountability research. First and 
foremost, given that political leaders strategically select their behavior in anticipation of 
public reactions, inferring the importance of executive approval and of democratic 
accountability mechanisms by analyzing observed patterns becomes problematic. As 
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Schultz notes regarding military crises, “to the extent that leaders value holding office, 
they are unlikely to make choices that lead to outcomes with high domestic political 
costs. If we can observe only the domestic costs that leaders choose to pay, then we will 
generally miss the cases in which these costs are large” (2001:33). Second, analyzing 
naturally occurring data might prove problematic when studying coercive foreign 
policies. As highlighted by Lacy and Niou (2004) studies of sanctions that examine 
cases in which these were actually implemented omit the most successful cases: the ones 
in which the threat alone was enough to modify the policies of another state. The same 
can be said of military coercion. Studying accountability experimentally can 
complement observational empirical studies by allowing us to carefully assess the casual 
links between political variables and citizen’s responses.   
Of course experimental research has important limitations, particularly regarding 
external validity. As noted by Levendusky and Horowitz in their study of audience costs 
(2012) one issue is the generalizability of a theory tested only with American 
respondents. They tackle this hurdle by highlighting the role the United States plays in 
the international system and by mentioning that scholars find similar results using 
international samples (Tomz 2007 in Argentina). The strategy I employ to counter this 
limitation is to conduct an experiment in the United Kingdom. I selected the United 
Kingdom for two reasons. First, the U.S. and the U.K. share important similarities. They 
are both relatively powerful democratic nations in the international system. This means 
that they are a good sample with which to test my theory because (a) domestic audiences 
in these states might expect their nation to get involved in an international crisis, and (b) 
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these nations are powerful enough that when their leaders publicly state they will 
implement costly foreign policies people believe them. Second, the U.S. and the U.K. 
differ regarding their democratic institutions. Given that my theory pertains to the role of 
domestic audiences in democratic nations, it was interesting to test it on both a 
presidential and a parliamentary democracy.  
A second issue is the generalizability of results obtained in a web-based 
experiment that lacks the complexities of real political environments. However, as noted 
by Trager and Vavreck, in an experiment “the sterility of the design helps to clarify the 
mechanisms at work in a way that observational methods cannot” (2011:533). 
Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) emphasize the importance of experimental realism. If 
an experiment has experimental realism it engages the same decision-making processes 
real world politics do. Although no one study can definitely ascertain external validity, I 
employ two strategies designed to strengthen experimental realism and maximize the 
applicability of results. First, participants were exposed to scenarios that mentioned real 
countries. Although participants knew they would be reading hypothetical scenarios (i.e., 
there was no deception), I used specific country names from Asia as part of the 
description of the crises to increase the authenticity of the scenarios. 17 While it may be 
argued that by using real country names I increase the susceptibility for contamination 
by existing biases, I assumed that participants in the study would be unfamiliar with the 
political realties of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as they have not been prominently 
                                                 
17
 In this sense my experiments differ from those of Tomz (2007), Trager and Vavreck (2011), and 
Levendusky and Horowitz (2012). In their audience costs experiments participants read abstract scenarios 
in which one country invades another.  
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mentioned in American news outlets recently. Second, I tested my hypotheses using 
alternative dependent variable measures (one static, another capturing changes in 
approval for the executive). In addition to helping evaluate the robustness of the results, 
according to McDermott (2011) this significantly enhances the external validity of 
experiments.  
A third issue regarding generalizability is whether experiments conducted with 
university students can be extrapolated to the broader adult population. Some scholars 
have emphasized the differences that exist between students and the general adult 
population (Sears 1986; Mintz, Redd and Vedlitz 2006). The strategy I employ to 
counter this potential limitation is to conduct the main experiment on a nationally 
representative sample of American adults. I do not, however, replicate the main 
experiment using a representative sample of British adults. Theoretically, I do not expect 
that individual characteristics that differ among student and non-student populations to 
change the general pattern of the findings. On this point, I refer skeptics to Mook (1983). 
Mook argues that what researchers are generalizing after conducting an experiment is 
the theory being tested, not the findings. If experimental evidence supports a theory and 
this theory applies to the general population, results can be considered a test of the 
theory. Previous studies of audience costs that have employed both national and student 
samples do not suggest any significant differences between these two groups (Trager and 
Vavreck 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). Neither have studies that 
experimentally examine the public’s reaction to casualties (Gartner 2008). Furthermore, 
when analyzing the results of student samples I compare the dependent variable means 
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across experimental conditions and assess which values of the independent variables 
lead to higher or lower dependent variable means. I do not claim that these means are 
indicative of the true population means. I only consider the means obtained in the 
nationally representative sample of American adults to reflect the true population 
parameters.  
Following Tomz (2007), Trager and Vavreck (2011), and Levendusky and 
Horowitz (2012), the experiments I conducted have a between-groups factorial design. 
In a between-groups design participants make choices in only one state of the world and 
responses made by those in different groups are compared. Participants in the 
experiments were exposed to only one crisis scenario. This design was chosen to avoid 
over-sensitizing respondents to the experimental factors. Exposure to different scenarios 
would have allowed participants to identify what the experimental variables were and 
would have most likely triggered a comparison between them that might artificially 
increase the differences in the dependent variable measures.  
The risk commonly associated with between-groups designs is that subject-
specific observable and unobservable characteristics might affect participants’ responses 
(Morton and Williams 2010). This has the potential to undermine the internal validity of 
the experiment, as measures for the dependent variables might be an effect of individual 
differences and not be causally linked to exposure to specific values of the independent 
variables. Although it is usually argued that internal validity is the greatest advantage of 
experimentation, this is only true when the researcher has effectively controlled the 
manipulation of the independent variables and ensured that what is being measured is 
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caused by these variables (McDermott 2002). In my experiments, random assignment of 
participants into experimental scenarios assures that the internal validity of the study is 
not threatened by using a between-groups design. I must note that using a between-
groups design means that participants were either exposed to a case of economic or 
military coercion (and not to a scenario in which they could select one over the other). 
This means that while I can compare approval ratings for individuals exposed to military 
or economic coercive I cannot infer how participants would have responded if they had 
to select between both coercive foreign policies.  
 
3.2. General Overview of Experiments in This Study 
The following sections present the experiments I conducted as part of my 
dissertation. The section immediately following this one describes the experiments I 
conducted with students sample in the United States (with Texas A&M undergraduates) 
and in the United Kingdom (with undergraduates at the University of Manchester and 
graduate students at University College London). The objective of these experiments 
was to test my hypotheses cross-nationally. The section that follows describes the 
procedures and results for the experiment I conducted on a nationally representative 
sample of American adults. The objective of conducting that experiment was to enhance 
the external validity of this study.   
The three experiments test the same hypotheses and the experimental design 
employed in these studies is identical. The scenarios participants were exposed to and 
the items with which I measured the dependent variables differ slightly across samples. 
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In this section I present the general research materials used to test my theory. When 
introducing each individual theory-testing experiment I will mention any modifications 
made to the materials described here.  
 Following Tomz (2007), Trager and Vavreck (2011), and Levendusky and 
Horowitz (2012) I conduct all my dissertation experiments online. Participants were told 
they were going to participate in a study of foreign policy. The instructions participants 
read are practically identical to the ones employed by Tomz (2007) and Trager and 
Vavreck (2011). These stated participants would read about U.S. relations (U.K. 
relations for the British sample) with other countries around the world, about a situation 
our country has faced in the past and will probably face again in the future.18  
 
3.3. Research Materials 
A first experiment was conducted on a sample of undergraduate students at 
Texas A&M University in October and November of 2010. A second experiment 
conducted in the United Kingdom was implemented during three different time periods 
(November of 2010 and March of 2011 with undergraduates at the University of 
Manchester; November of 2011 with graduate students at University College London). 
The third experiment, that tested my theory on a national sample of American adults, 
was conducted in December of 2011. Table 1 shows the experimental design: 
 
 
                                                 
18
 For the exact text for this and all research materials please see the Appendix. 
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Table 1 Experimental Scenarios 
Threat of Economic Sanctions Threat of Military Action  
Consistent 
Executive 
Inconsistent 
Executive 
Consistent 
Executive 
Inconsistent 
Executive 
Salient 
Crisis 
I II III IV 
Non-Salient 
Crisis 
V VI VII VIII 
 
 
 
3.3.1. Experimental Manipulations 
The salience of a crisis was initially introduced following what Tomz had done in 
his 2007 experiment. He manipulated national interest by having participants read that 
the safety and the economy of the United States were at stake. In the experiments I 
conducted on the student samples I followed Tomz and manipulated salience by stating 
that, “If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over the whole country, Asia’s regional 
balance of power will shift drastically. This will significantly affect U.S. economic and 
security interests in Asia.  Kazakh authorities have time after time demonstrated they 
are very hostile against the U.S.” Participants exposed to the non-salient scenarios read 
that, “If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over their neighbor, neither the safety nor 
the economy of the United States will be affected.”  
 By the time I conducted the experiment on the national sample of American 
adults, I had changed the manipulation of the salience of a crisis. The new manipulation 
differed from previous experiments of audience costs, but I believe it improved the 
experiment. It augmented the experimental realism of the procedure as it made the 
scenarios more concise, concrete and authentic. The new manipulation of salience does 
not mention threats to economic interests. As noted by a committee member, 
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confounding a threat to national security with a threat to national economic interests was 
problematic as they could work in opposite directions. In the national sample, a salient 
crisis was introduced as: “Uzbekistan, the country that has been invaded, has abundant 
mines of high quality uranium that can be used for the development of nuclear weapons. 
Kazakhstan, the invading country has a history of supporting anti-Western and anti-U.S. 
terrorist groups. A victory by the attacking country would constitute a severe risk to 
U.S. national security.” Non-salient crises were presented as: “If Kazakhstan’s military 
forces do take over their neighbor, it will pose no threat to U.S. national security. 
However, these actions constitute a clear violation of international law as chartered by 
the United Nations.” 
 The type of coercive policy threat was introduced the same way in all 
experiments. Half the participants read that, “Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president 
in a public statement in the media said that the United States would impose economic 
sanctions on the government of Kazakhstan.” The other half of respondents read that, 
“Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president in a public statement in the media said that 
the United States would send U.S. troops to defend the weaker country from its 
invaders.” 
 Following Tomz 2007, neutral language was used to introduce executive 
consistency/inconsistency. Stating that the executive “backed down,” “contradicted 
previous commitments,” or “was inconsistent” has clear negative connotations that can 
bias results in favor of supporting audience costs (Tomz 2007: 825). The manipulation I 
employed was almost identical to that used by Tomz. Scenarios in which the executive 
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was consistent were presented as, “Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. The 
President of the U.S. has sent troops that are now fighting against Kazakhstan.” For 
the inconsistent conditions, participants learned that: “Kazakhstan has continued its 
invasion. In the end, the President of the U.S. did not send troops.” 
 
3.3.2. Dependent Variable Measures 
The main dependent variable, approval, was gauged by asking participants how 
much they approved of the executive’s actions in the international crisis scenario they 
were exposed to. Approval was measured in two ways. The first measure is approval 
after the implementation of a foreign policy threat. After reading summary bullet points, 
participants were asked, “In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the 
President acted?” and had to mark their responses on a scale ranging from 0 (definitely 
disapprove) to 10 (definitely approve). This variable was used to compare how 
participants exposed to different types of crises evaluated the actions of the executive. 
The second measure is the difference in executive approval after a coercive foreign 
policy threat was made and after the executive either implemented this threat or reneged. 
This variable, ∆, captures the change in approval for each individual participant.19 
Employing alternative measures enables me to assess the effects of the three 
experimental factors across experimental groups and also for each individual. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, using two measures helps evaluate the robustness of 
                                                 
19
 Each participant answered the question, “In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the 
President acted?” twice, on an 11-point scale. The item was presented for the first time after a threat was 
issued (before the executive followed through or backed down) and for the second time after the executive 
followed through or backed down. ∆ is the difference between these responses. Summary bullet points 
were presented before measuring approval both times. 
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the results while enhancing the external validity of the study (McDermott 2011). H1 
(which predicts the effect of the salience of a crisis on public policy preferences) is 
tested using the first measure. H2 (which claims that executive inconsistency will be 
generally punished) and H3 (which predicts that policy preferences will affect 
accountability) are tested employing both measures.   
 As has become customary in experimental studies of audience costs (Tomz 2007; 
Trager and Vavreck 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012), I assume that an increase in 
executive approval corresponds with heightened popular support and that a decrease in 
approval is equivalent to holding the executive accountable. Tomz (2007) uses a 7-point 
scale to measure approval for the executive; Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) use a 5-
point one. I employ an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 to 10, as I think it more closely 
mimics approval questions and “political thermometers” common in the U.S. The items 
used to measure the other dependent variables are described in the experimental sections, 
and the exact wording of all scenarios and items can be seen in the Appendix.    
The following sections describe the experimental procedures in more detail. The 
final sub-section of each section summarizes the main findings. The cross-national test 
of theory section includes a comparison of results found in the student samples in the 
U.S. and the U.K. In the concluding section of this dissertation I offer a general 
summary of the experimental findings and suggest their implications for international 
relations theory.  
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4. CROSS-NATIONAL STUDENT SAMPLES 
 
 
In this section I test the hypotheses presented in the theory section by conducting 
an experiment with two cross-national student samples. The first study was conducted 
with a student sample in the United States (with Texas A&M undergraduates) in October 
and November of 2010. The second study was conducted in the United Kingdom in three 
different time periods (November of 2010 and March of 2011 with undergraduates at the 
University of Manchester; November of 2011 with graduate students at University 
College London). Conducting an experiment with British participants strengthens the 
external validity of my dissertation. Experimental studies of audience costs have 
typically been conducted in the United States (Tomz 2007; Trager and Vavreck 2011; 
Levendusky and Horowitz 2012). However, Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) note that 
the generalizability of a theory tested only with American respondents can be 
questioned.  
Comparing accountability mechanisms in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom has two important advantages. First, both states are relatively powerful 
democratic nations. The U.S. is obviously more powerful than the U.K., but both are 
powerful enough that their citizens may expect their executives to get involved in 
international crises, even if their national security or economic interests are not at stake. 
Both states have a history of intervening in international crises, employing both 
economic and military coercion.  
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Second, the U.S. and the U.K. have different democratic institutions, and it will 
be interesting to compare accountability mechanisms across presidential and 
parliamentary regimes. Both states are representative democracies. Representative 
democracies have a chain of delegation and accountability in which agents act on behalf 
of principals (Strøm 2000). The main difference is that in presidential regimes voters 
(principals) elect the executive (agent) directly. In parliamentary regimes, voters 
(principals) elect members of parliament. Members of parliament are at the same time 
both agents (of the voters) and principals (of the cabinet).20 In both systems government 
representatives, including the President and the Prime Minister, are ultimately 
accountable to the public. 
American Presidents and British Prime Ministers are considered responsible for 
most national foreign policies. In the U.S. the President is the commander in chief, and 
since the Second World War constitutional procedures stating that Congress has to 
approve of military interventions have been bypassed. In the U.K. the Prime Minister is 
generally considered the most powerful agent in the country.21 This is particularly so in 
the foreign policy realm. According to Wren, 
Although much parliamentary oversight of other areas of policy derive 
from legislation passed through due democratic processes (debates in the 
Parliament, votes, etc), there is no similar process for foreign affairs due to 
the continued existence of the Royal Prerogative. This hangover from the 
time of the absolute monarch who could take Britain to war over a 
                                                 
20
“In a pure form of parliamentary democracy, voters in each district elect a single representative in a 
unicameral legislature. Members of parliament in turn delegate to a prime minister overseeing an 
executive branch of ministries with non-overlapping jurisdictions. In contrast, voters in a presidential 
system typically elect multiple competing agents. Thus, parliamentary democracy means a particularly 
simple form of delegation” (Strøm 2000:268-69, describing cases without a coalition government). 
21
 Fifty-eight percent of Britons surveyed named the Prime Minister as the pressure group who holds most 
power in the Survey of officials of business, labor, and campaign groups (Baggott 1992).  
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marriage proposal, gives the power to the Prime Minister to carry out 
many of the acts that make a foreign policy –from going to war to signing 
treaties. So broad are the powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative that 
even attempts to enumerate them are resisted by the Cabinet Office (2005: 
42).  
 
If the executive is generally responsible for conducting foreign policy in the U.S. 
and the U.K., it follows that domestic audiences will hold them accountable if they 
implement policies that do not represent their preferences. The objective of this section 
is to examine whether American and British citizens’ reactions to the executive’s 
handling of international crises are influenced by the same factors.  
 I described the experimental design and research materials in the section 
introducing the empirics section of this dissertation and will not repeat them here. I will 
first present the results for the experiment conducted on the sample of American 
students, then for the British ones. I conclude the section by summarizing the results and 
offering a cross-national comparison. 
 
4.1. American Student Sample  
Four hundred and fifty one undergraduate students from Texas A&M University 
enrolled in political science classes participated in the experiment. Before presenting the 
results, I address the analyses of the manipulation checks.  
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4.1.1. Internal Validity of the Experimental Procedure 
Overall, analyses show that the majority of participants understood the values of 
the independent variables as intended. The effects of each independent variable on the 
pertinent manipulation check are statistically significant (each with a p-value of .000). 
The data on each individual experimental factor are: 
(a) Salience of the International Crises: The first manipulation check asked 
participants if the crisis they read about was salient (coded as 1) or not salient 
(coded as 0). The mean value for this manipulation check for those exposed to 
salient crises scenarios was .877, while the mean for those exposed to crises that 
were not salient was .179. If all participants had understood this manipulation 
check correctly the mean for those exposed to salient crises scenarios would be 1, 
while the mean for those exposed to crises that were not salient would be 0.  
(b) Foreign Policy Threat: Participants were asked what the President said he was 
going to do in the report they had read. They could respond that he announced he 
was going to implement economic sanctions (coded as 0) or that he had 
announced that the U.S. was going to send troops to stop the aggressors (coded 
as 1). The mean value for participants that read the economic coercion scenario 
was .031. The mean for participants exposed to a military coercion scenario was 
.973. If 100% of participants had comprehended this manipulation check the 
mean value for participants who read the economic coercion scenario would have 
been 0 and the mean for those exposed to a military coercion would be 1.  
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(c) Executive Consistency: The final item in the questionnaire asked what the 
President ended up doing in the report they just read about. Participants could 
answer that the President had implemented sanctions, sent U.S. troops or done 
nothing. Responses were later recoded into a binary measure where 1 = 
consistently implemented the promised coercive foreign policy, and 0 = no 
policy was implemented, and therefore the executive was inconsistent. The mean 
value for participants that where exposed to a consistent executive was .976. The 
mean value for those exposed to a scenario where the executive acted 
inconsistently was .070. If every participant had understood this manipulation 
check correctly the mean for those who read about an executive being consistent 
would be 1, whereas the mean for an inconsistent executive would be 0.  
 
4.1.2. Results  
The general pattern of findings shows that the three experimental factors (the 
salience of a crisis, the type of foreign policy threat made by the executive, and whether 
the executive was consistent or inconsistent) affect when the public will reward or 
punish American Presidents for foreign policies. Specifically, the salience of a crisis 
determines constituents’ preferences for economic or military coercive foreign policies 
in times of international crises.22 These policy preferences in turn affect whether 
inconsistent leader’ approval increases or decreases. I find that constituents privilege 
                                                 
22
 The objective of this study is to identify when audiences will reward or punish leaders. Individual policy 
preferences are measured indirectly through measures of executive approval after the executive has 
committed to economic or military coercive foreign policies. 
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executives that act according to their policy preferences and do not always punish 
inconsistency.  
 
(H1) Does the Salience of an International Crisis Affect Policy Preferences?  
To assess whether participants’ evaluation of executives who threatened and 
implemented economic or military coercion was contingent on the salience of an 
international crisis, a 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA was conducted on executive 
approval after the President had implemented either economic or military coercion.23  
 
 
Table 2 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for American Students 
Observations: 191 R-Squared = .855 Adj R-Squared = .851 
Source Partial SS df  MS F  Prob. > F  
Model 7386.089a 4 1846.522 274.721 .000 
Salience of Crisis 301.362 1 301.362 44.836 .000 
Foreign Policy Threat 6.319 1 6.319 .940 .334 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy Threat 55.679 1 55.679 8.284 .004 
Residual  1256.911 187 6.721  
Total 8643.000 191  
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the significant effect the independent variable Salience of Crisis 
on has domestic support for the executive [F(1,191)= 44.836, p=.000].  When an 
international crisis is salient citizens are predisposed to approve of executives who 
implement military or economic threats. Executive approval is higher (M=7.24) when an 
international crisis is salient compared to approval in a crisis that is not salient (M=4.72). 
                                                 
23
 H1 tests policy preferences only, and not reactions to executive inconsistency. Therefore responses 
provided to experimental conditions in which the executive was inconsistent, i.e. when a coercive foreign 
policy was threatened but not implemented, were not included in this analyses. These conditions were 
included in the sample with which H2 and H3 are tested.  
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This lends support for the popular ‘rally ‘round the flag’ thesis popular in international 
relations and in American political behavior. 
The analyses show no significant main effect of Foreign Policy Threat. That is, 
whether the executive implements economic or military coercion does not directly 
influence approval. The effect of Foreign Policy Threat on approval is contingent on the 
salience of the crisis at hand. In line with H1 the analyses show a significant two-way 
interaction between Salience of Crisis and the Foreign Policy Threat [F(1,191)= 8.284, 
p=.004].  Figure 1 shows that in a salient crisis, approval for the executive is high after a 
commitment to send troops is made (M=7.60) and also when economic sanctions are 
threatened (M=6.88). On the other hand, when a crisis is not salient approval following a 
military threat is low (M=4.00). Executive approval after a threat is made to impose 
economic sanctions is significantly higher (M=5.45).  
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Figure 1 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for American Students 
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 (H2) Is Executive Inconsistency Punished Across the Board? 
To assess whether approval for consistent executives is higher than approval for 
inconsistent ones, two 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVAs were conducted. The first 
was conducted on executive approval measured after the President had either followed 
through or backed down on threats of military or economic coercion. The second was 
conducted on ∆, the difference in executive approval that allows us to examine whether 
executive approval increased or decreased for each individual participant. ∆ is calculated 
by subtracting participants’ approval of the executive after she acted consistently or 
inconsistently from the approval they had previously awarded her after a coercive 
foreign policy threat had been made.  
Before presenting the analyses I will briefly describe the data. The highest mean 
for the first approval measure is observed in salient crises when the executive 
consistently intervened militarily (M=7.55). The lowest means are observed when the 
executive reneges after making a commitment to a course of coercive foreign policy in a 
salient crisis (M=2.50 for a military threat, M=3.04 for economic coercion).  
The second variable with which approval is measured is ∆. Interestingly, most ∆ 
values are negative, implying that executives have higher approval when making an 
initial foreign policy threat than after having had the chance to implement or renege on 
it. The highest means for ∆ are observed after the executive acts consistently and 
imposes the economic sanctions she had threatened (M= .25 in non-salient crises, M= 
.22 in salient ones). The largest drops in ∆ occur when the executive is inconsistent in 
salient crises (M= -4.18 for military coercion, M= -3.26 for economic coercion).  
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Tables 3 and 4 show the different main and interactive effects the experimental 
factors have on both approval measures. The main effects of Executive Consistency and 
the interactions between this variable and Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat 
address H2, as they assess the effect of executive consistency/inconsistency on approval. 
The three-way interaction among the three independent variables tests H3, as it examines 
the effects particular policy preferences have on holding the executive accountable for 
inconsistent behavior and will therefore be addressed in the following section. The effect 
of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and the interaction between them, refers 
exclusively to holding the executive accountable for not implementing public policy 
preferences and were already discussed in the test for H1.24 
 
 
Table 3 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on Approval for 
American Students  
Observations: 451 R-Squared = .772 Adj R-Squared = .768 
Source Partial SS df  MS F  Prob. > F  
Model 11299.808a 8 1412.476 187.895 .000 
Salience of Crisis 36.995 1 36.995 4.921 .027 
Foreign Policy Threat 1.074 1 1.074 .143 .706 
Executive Consistency 856.303 1 856.303 113.910 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy Threat 6.207 1 6.207 .826 .364 
Salience of Crisis* Executive Consistency 288.897 1 288.897 38.431 .000 
Foreign Policy Threat* Executive 
Consistency .222 1 .222 .030 .864 
3-way interaction 58.010 1 58.010 7.717 .006 
Residual  3330.192 443 7.517  
Total 14630.000 451  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 The p-values for this interaction in Table 2 and Table 3 differ slightly as the results in Table 2 are 
limited to only those cases in which the executive acted consistently.  
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Table 4 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on ∆ for American 
Students 
Observations: 451 R-Squared = .287 Adj R-Squared = .274 
Source Partial SS df  MS F  Prob. > F  
Model 1822.055 8 227.757 22.308 .000 
Salience of Crisis 100.240 1 100.240 9.818 .002 
Foreign Policy Threat 1.144 1 1.144 .112 .738 
Executive Consistency 880.757 1 880.757 86.266 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy Threat 24.334 1 24.334 2.383 .123 
Salience of Crisis* Executive Consistency 118.015 1 118.015 11.559 .001 
Foreign Policy Threat* Executive 
Consistency 
6.110 1 6.110 .598 .440 
3-way interaction 37.945 1 37.945 3.717 .055 
Residual  4522.945 443 10.210  
Total 6345.000 451  
 
 
 
 Table 3 shows that Executive Consistency has a significant main effect on 
approval [F(1,451)=113.91 p=.000].25 As highlighted by scholars that stress the 
importance of a president consistently implementing her foreign policy promises in 
times of international crises, executives that back down are held accountable. When the 
executive consistently follows through on any of the coercive foreign policy threats, in 
both salient and non-salient crises, approval is higher (M=6.05) than when she backs 
down after making a public statement committing to economic or military coercion (M= 
3.29). Table 4 shows that Executive Consistency also has a significant main effect on ∆ 
[F(1,451)=86.266 p=.000]. ∆ for consistent executives is positive (M= .07), and negative 
for inconsistent ones (M= -2.74). This provides evidence for the notion that people 
generally have a tendency to punish inconsistent leaders, and that audience costs can be 
                                                 
25
 Salience of Crisis also has a significant main effect on approval [F(1,451)=4.921, p=.027] and on ∆ 
[F(1,451)=9.818, p=.002]. The means suggest that when a crisis is salient approval is higher than when a 
crisis is not salient. I do not discuss these results further here, as they test H1.  
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paid in both military and economic crises. Although the concept of audience costs was 
originally developed to understand the initiation of military conflicts, these results 
support H2 and suggest that the scope of the concept can be expanded to explain the 
imposition of sanctions. I must note however, that this effect is qualified by an important 
interaction. 
 The two-way interaction between Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency 
significantly affects executive approval [F(1,451)=38.43, p=.000]. This means that 
although domestic audiences tend to prefer consistent leaders to inconsistent ones, this 
main effect does not influence approval similarly across crises that are salient and those 
that are not. As we can see in Figure 2 executive inconsistency following an economic or 
military threat is much more severely punished in salient crises. When an international 
crisis is salient, approval following the consistent actions of a president is significantly 
higher (M=7.14) than approval after the executive backs down from her coercive foreign 
policy threats (M=2.77). The same trend can be observed in crises that are not salient, 
but the differences in approval means are much lower (M=3.80 for inconsistent 
executives compared to M= 4.96 for consistent ones).26  
 
                                                 
26
 A t-test shows that the two means for non-salient crises, 3.80 and 4.96 are significantly different from 
each other (p-value= .000).  
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Figure 2 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency on Approval for American Students  
 
 
 
The interaction between Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency also affects 
∆ [F(1,451)=11.559, p=.001]. ∆ values are positive when the executive follows through 
on her threats (M= .109 in salient crises, M= .029 in non-salient ones). ∆ values are 
negative whenever the President reneges, and the mean is particularly low in salient 
crises (M= -1.75 for non-salient crises, M= -3.72 for salient ones). Figure 3 shows that 
the decline in approval for inconsistent executives in salient crises more than doubles the 
decline in crises that are not salient. The concept of audience costs was designed to help 
explain inter-state signaling behavior in salient crises. It is precisely in those crises 
where inconsistent executives can expect to pay higher audience costs. However, the 
audience cost logic is applicable to lesser international incidents as well. Even if the 
magnitude of domestic political audience costs is lower when the executive backs down 
in a crisis that does not threaten national security or economic interests, losing domestic 
support in times of internal crises can be detrimental. 
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Figure 3 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency on ∆ for American Students  
 
 
 
(H3) How do Policy Preferences Affect Accountability?   
This section tests H3, that is, here I examine whether the preferences for specific 
coercive foreign policies given the salience of a crisis affect the likelihood that executive 
consistency will be rewarded or that executive inconsistency will be punished. The 
three-way interactions between Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive 
Consistency presented in Tables 3 and 4 show that these factors have a significant joint 
effect on executive approval [F(1,451)=7.72, p=.006] and also on ∆, [F(1,451)=3.717, 
p=.055]. These interactions are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.  
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Figure 4 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat and Executive Consistency on Approval for 
American Students 
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Figure 5 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat and Executive Consistency on ∆ for 
American Students  
 
 
 
The results support H3.a. In salient crises approval for executives that enact 
military or economic coercion is high. The highest mean for executive approval is for 
presidents that consistently enact military action in salient crises (M=7.55). The mean 
for economic coercion is lower than that of military coercion (M=6.73), but remains 
high. Although military action receives more popular support when a crisis threatens 
national security, threatening economic coercion might provide the executive with 
enough popular support in times of conflict. Inconsistency is punished for both military 
Non-Salient crises Salient crises 
Non-Salient crises Salient crises 
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(M=2.5) and economic coercion (M=3.03). An examination of changes in executive 
approval also supports H3.a. In salient crises the lowest values for ∆ are for executives 
who renege on their threats (M= -4.18 in cases of military coercion, M= -3.30 in cases of 
economic coercion). On the other hand, ∆ for executives that act consistently are not 
negative (M= 0 in cases of military coercion, M= 0.22 in cases of economic coercion).  
Approval results support H3.b. In non-salient crises approval for executives that 
consistently implement economic threats will rise whereas approval for executives that 
renege on economic threats will be low. In crises that are not salient executive approval 
is high after sanctions are implemented (M=5.51). An analysis of ∆ confirms these 
findings. When an international crisis is not salient, executives who commit to imposing 
sanctions will see their approval increase when they impose them (M= .25). In non-
salient crises, executives who commit to imposing sanctions and subsequently renege 
pay audience costs (M= 3.59). ∆ for executives that are inconsistent after threatening 
sanctions is negative and large (M= -2.34). 
As predicted in H3.c, executive inconsistency will not always be punished. When 
an executive threatens military action in a non-salient crisis and subsequently backs 
down, her approval will be indistinguishable (M=4.02) from the approval she would 
have had she followed through on her threat (M=4.41). Values for ∆ also suggest that 
executive inconsistency is not punished when military action is threatened but not 
implemented in crises that are not salient. ∆ for consistent and inconsistent executives is 
negative in both cases (M= -1.16 for inconsistent Presidents, M= -.20 for consistent 
ones) when military coercion is threatened in crises that are not salient. Executives that 
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commit to military intervention when national interests are not at stake will lose support 
when this commitment is made27 and also when the threat is actually implemented (M= -
.20). 
 
4.1.3. Summary of Results for the American Student Sample 
American audiences evaluate the executive in times of international crises by 
comparing the type of foreign policy threats she makes, and the actions she implements, 
to their own personal policy preferences. These public preferences for military or 
economic coercion are determined by the salience of the crisis at hand. When an 
international crisis is salient, American audiences will prefer that the executive threaten 
military or economic coercion. However, when an international crisis is not salient, 
Americans will prefer to engage in economic coercion and will not support executives 
that commit to military action. American Presidents that implement coercive foreign 
policies that do not represent the preferences of her constituents see their approval 
decline.  
 
4.2. British Student Sample 
One hundred and fourteen undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Manchester and from University College London enrolled in economics 
and/or political science classes participated in the experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. Before presenting the results, 
                                                 
27
 As discussed in the results section examining H1, in a non-salient crisis, executive approval is higher 
following economic coercion (M=5.57) than after a military threat is issued (M=4.91). 
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I describe the changes made to the research materials and present the analyses of the 
manipulation checks.  
 
Changes Made to the Research Material: The web-based experiment was framed as a 
study of British foreign policy. The instructions and materials were almost identical to 
those used in the experiment conducted with Texas A&M students. Differences include: 
(1) mentioning foreign policy threats and actions carried out by the Prime Minister 
(instead of by the President), and (2) describing the crises as relevant for British national 
security and economic interests. Additionally, given that both the University of 
Manchester and University College London tend to have diverse student samples, after 
the manipulation checks participants were asked if they were British citizens.28 
 
4.2.1. Internal Validity of the Experimental Procedure 
Overall, analyses show that most participants understood the values of the 
independent variables as intended. The effects of each independent variable on the 
pertinent manipulation check are statistically significant (each with a p-value of .000). 
The data on each individual experimental factor are: 
(a) Salience of the International Crises: The first manipulation check asked 
participants if the crisis they read about was salient (coded as 1) or not salient 
(coded as 0). The mean value for this manipulation check for those exposed to 
                                                 
28
 75.44% of the total respondents are British citizens. Results that are significant in the sample that 
includes citizens and non-citizens are also significant in the sample made up exclusively of citizens, 
although p-values differ slightly.  
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salient crises scenarios was .689, while the mean for those exposed to crises that 
were not salient was .020. If all participants had understood this manipulation 
check correctly the mean for those exposed to salient crises scenarios would be 1, 
while the mean for those exposed to crises that were not salient would be 0.  
(b) Foreign Policy Threat: Participants were asked what the Prime Minister said he 
was going to do in the report they had read. They could respond that he 
announced he was going to implement economic sanctions (coded as 0) or that he 
had announced that he was going to send British troops to stop the aggressors 
(coded as 1). The mean value for participants that read the economic coercion 
scenario was .018. Every single participant understood when military coercion 
was employed, as the mean for participants exposed to a military coercion 
scenario was 1.000. If 100% of participants had comprehended the manipulation 
of cases of economic coercion the mean value for this manipulation check in 
cases of economic coercion would have been 0.  
(c) Prime Minister Consistency: The final item in the questionnaire asked what the 
Prime Minister ended up doing in the report they just read about. Participants 
could answer that the Prime Minister had imposed sanctions, sent British troops 
or done nothing. Responses were later recoded into a binary measure where 1 = 
consistently implemented the promised coercive foreign policy, and 0 = no 
policy was implemented, and therefore the Prime Minister was inconsistent. The 
mean value for participants that where exposed to a consistent Prime Minister 
was 1.000. The mean value for those exposed to a scenario where the Prime 
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Minister acted inconsistently was .000. This means that 100% of participants 
comprehended the manipulation of this experimental factor as I had intended. 
 
4.2.2. Results 
This experiment was designed to assess whether British audiences reward and 
punish their Prime Ministers for coercive foreign policy threats and actions in a manner 
comparable to American audiences. Albeit some interesting differences, I find that the 
concept of audience costs travels well from American to British constituencies.  
 
(H1) Does the Salience of an International Crisis Affect Policy Preferences?  
After being exposed to scenarios in which the Prime Minister threatened 
economic or military coercion in a salient or a non-salient crisis, participants decided 
whether they approved of the threat their representative made (before they learn of her 
consistency or inconsistency).29 This subsection examines which independent variables 
influence this initial approval measure and thus pertains to British audiences’ foreign 
policy preferences. Approval for the Prime Minister was measured on an 11-point scale, 
and a 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA was conducted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 In the analyses conducted with the American student sample and with the representative sample of 
American adults H1 is tested after the executive has implemented a foreign policy threat. This procedure 
cannot be executed with the British student sample however, as limiting the sample exclusively to cases in 
which the Prime Minister was consistent brings the sample size down to 54.  
 77 
 
Table 5 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for British Students 
Observations: 114 R-Squared = .872 Adj R-Squared = .867 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 4777.503 4 1194.379 187.020 .000 
Salience of Crisis 1.051 1 1.051 .165 .686 
Foreign Policy Threat 21.016 1 21.016 3.291 .072 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy 
Threat 
4.439 1 4.439 .000 .406 
Residual 702.497 110 6.386  
Total 5480.000 114  
 
 
 
  Table 5 indicates that Foreign Policy Threat [F(1,114)=3.291, p=.072] is on the 
verge of statistical significance. Participants’ approval for the Prime Minister was higher 
(M=6.882) when she committed to imposing economic sanctions than when she 
promised military action (M=6.015). T-test results show (p=.052) that when a crisis is 
not salient and the Prime Minister promises economic coercion her approval is 
significantly higher (M=7.719) than when she commits to military coercion 
(M=5.913).30 On the other hand, when a crisis is salient there is no such difference. A 
Prime Minister that commits to imposing sanctions and one that promises to send troops 
receives similar approval ratings (M=6.586 and M=6.118 respectively). These results 
provide some support for H1 and are illustrated in Figure 6:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 The reason this t-test is statistically significant but the interaction between the variables Salience of 
Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat is not is that there is an area of overlap between the lower confidence 
interval (6.232; set at 95%) for the mean approval in the non-salient condition where the Prime Minister 
commits to economic sanctions and the upper confidence interval (6.957; set at 95%) for the mean 
approval for the non-salient condition in which the Prime Minister promises military action.  
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Figure 6 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for British Students 
 
 
(H2) Is the Prime Minister’s Inconsistency Punished Across the Board? 
After being exposed to scenarios in which the Prime Minister consistently carried 
out a coercive foreign policy threat or backed down after making such a threat, approval 
was measured for a second time. Two 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVAs were 
conducted. The first was conducted on approval measured after the Prime Minister had 
either followed through or backed down on threats of military or economic coercion. 
The second was conducted on ∆, the difference in approval that allows us to examine 
whether executive approval increased or decreased for each individual participant. As in 
the American student sample, ∆ is calculated by subtracting participants’ approval of the 
Prime Minister after she acted consistently or inconsistently from the approval they had 
previously awarded her after a coercive foreign policy threat had been made. ∆ takes on 
positive values if a participant’s approval rating of the Prime Minister increases after 
learning if he followed through or backed down. Alternatively, a ∆ value will be 
negative if approval ratings for the Prime Minister decrease after learning if she followed 
through or backed down. 
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 Most ∆ values are negative, which indicates that approval for the Prime Minister 
tends to be higher before she implements or reneges on a foreign policy threat. 
Descriptively, the highest means for ∆ are observed in salient crises when the Prime 
Minister implements the coercive threat she had committed to (M= .91 for economic 
sanctions, M= .37 for military intervention). This differs from the highest means 
observed in the sample of American students, as approval for the executive in that 
sample had the biggest jump after she imposed sanctions in non-salient crises (M= .25) 
and following troop deployment in salient crises (M= .22). For Americans the main 
factor in rewarding executives is that foreign policy threats be contingent on the salience 
of an international crisis, while for Britons that the Prime Minister fulfills her promises 
when a crisis is salient takes center stage.   
 A similar contrast between American and British audiences can be observed 
when comparing the largest drops in approval. For British subjects, the largest drops 
occur when the Prime Minister reneges on a coercive threat in non-salient crises (M= -
6.31 for sanctions; M= -4.27 for military action). For American citizens, the largest 
drops in approval are observed in non-salient crises after the executive does not carry out 
the economic sanctions she had promised (M= -2.34), and in salient crises when the 
executive backs down after issuing a military threat (M= -4.18). 
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Table 6 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat and Prime Minister Consistency on Approval 
for British Students  
Observations: 114 R-Squared = .800 Adj R-Squared = .784 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 2791.342 8 348.918 52.862 .000 
Salience of Crisis 67.281 1 67.281 10.193 .002 
Foreign Policy Threat .301 1 .301 .046 .831 
Prime Minister Consistency 438.218 1 438.218 66.391 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy 
Threat 
1.658 1 1.658 .251 .617 
Salience of Crisis* Prime Minister 
Consistency 
1.746 1 1.746 .264 .608 
Foreign Policy Threat* Prime Minister 
Consistency 
10.359 1 10.359 1.569 .213 
3-way interaction 3.305 1 3.305 .501 .481 
Residual 702.497 699.658 6.601  
Total 3491.000 114  
 
 
 
Table 7 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat and Prime Minister Consistency on ∆ for 
British Students  
Observations: 114 R-Squared = .537 Adj R-Squared = .502 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 1136.634 8 142.079 15.362 .000 
Salience of Crisis 78.452 1 78.452 8.482 .004 
Foreign Policy Threat 26.173 1 26.173 2.830 .095 
Prime Minister Consistency 490.185 1 490.185 53.000 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy 
Threat 6.808 1 6.808 .736 .393 
Salience of Crisis* Prime Minister 
Consistency 19.629 1 19.629 2.122 .148 
Foreign Policy Threat* Prime Minister 
Consistency 17.086 1 17.086 1.847 .177 
3-way interaction 1.437 1 1.437 .155 .694 
Residual 980.366 106 9.249  
Total 2117.000 114  
 
 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show that two experimental factors affect domestic audiences’ 
propensity to approve of the Prime Minister in times of international crises. First, the 
analyses show that regardless of the type of threat the Prime Minister makes or whether 
such policies are implemented there is a significant effect of Salience of Crisis on 
approval [F(1,114)=10.193, p=.002] and on ∆ [F(1,114)=8.482, p=.004]. When an 
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international crisis is salient approval for the Prime Minister is higher (M=5.32) than 
when a crisis is not salient (M=3.75). Salience of Crisis also affects ∆. Although 
approval for the Prime Minister is always higher immediately following a foreign policy 
threat than when she implements her promise or reneges on it, the drop is significantly 
steeper when the crisis at hand is not salient (M= -2.75 for non-salient crises, M= -1.06 
for salient ones). Interestingly, the opposite pattern is observed with American 
audiences. In a salient crisis the difference in executive approval just after a threat is 
issued and after it is implemented or reneged on is much steeper (M= -1.81) than when a 
crisis is not salient (M= -.86). 
The question that emerges at this point is why the salience of a crisis has a main 
effect on this approval measure but not on approval before the implementation of a 
threat (the measure used to test H1). It is entirely plausible that British audiences do not 
consider an international crisis as being salient as readily as American audiences do due 
to their non-hegemonic world role. The United States plays a pivotal role in the 
preservation of the international system and is more interconnected with nations around 
the globe than the United Kingdom. This position should make it easier for Americans to 
believe that an international crisis in Asia can threaten national security or economic 
interests. For Britons the threshold to consider an international crisis as salient is higher. 
When the Prime Minister makes an initial threat, British citizens are not very likely to 
consider a crisis as salient, even if they are told it threatens national security and 
economic interests. Only in a second phase in which the Prime Minister is actually 
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enacting a coercive foreign policy (or when she decides to back down on her threat) will 
a crisis be considered salient.  
I find support for H2, as Prime Minister’s Consistency has a significant effect on 
approval [F(1,114)=66.391 p=.000]. As highlighted by scholars that stress the 
importance of leaders consistently implementing foreign policy promises in times of 
international crises, Prime Ministers that back down see their approval decrease. When 
the Prime Minister consistently follows through on a coercive foreign policy threat 
approval is higher (M=6.54) than when she backs down (M= 2.53). This provides 
evidence for the notion that people generally have a tendency to punish inconsistent 
leaders, and that audience costs can be paid in both military and economic crises on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Prime Minister Consistency also affects ∆ [F(1,114)= 53.000, 
p=.000]. As in the American sample, Prime Ministers that consistently deliver on their 
foreign policies threats see approval ratings rise (M=.22) compared to approval for 
Prime Ministers who back down (M= -4.02).  
It is interesting to note that British participants, unlike American ones, do not 
punish executive inconsistency more in salient crises. I did not anticipate this difference 
between samples and do not have a theoretical explanation for it. It is feasible that 
British history plays a role in this predilection for fulfilling commitments without 
considering if doing so is necessarily in one’s best interest. Kesselman, Krieger and 
Joseph note the effects lacking a formal written constitution have had on British reliance 
on political customs, “the structure and principles of many areas of government have 
been accepted by constitutional authorities for so long that appeal to convention has 
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enormous cultural force. Thus, widely agreed-on rules of conduct, rather than law or 
U.S.-style checks and balances, set the limits of governmental power” (2004:49). It is 
also possible that cultural characteristics of British citizens play a role in explaining the 
pivotal role Prime Minister Consistency plays in determining executive approval. 
Americans will not always punish executive inconsistency because what matters is not 
only whether the President was consistent but whether she was going to implement a 
policy they agreed with in the first place. This is not the case across the pond. British 
citizens will punish Prime Ministers who back down after having threatened a policy no 
matter what, even if they did not favor the policy she reneged upon. As noted by 
Almond and Verba (1963), British political culture is characterized by deference to 
authority. It is possible that this motivates Britons to rely excessively on the actions of 
the Prime Minister, disregarding their own personal policy preferences.  
 
(H3) How do Policy Preferences Affect Accountability?   
In the sample of American students I test H3 by analyzing the effects the three-
way interactions among Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive 
Consistency have on approval and on ∆. In the British student sample these interactions 
are not significant. This means that I find no conclusive support for H3. However, an 
evaluation of ∆ values offers suggests support for H3.a and H3.b. As mentioned above, 
∆ values are at their highest in salient crises when the Prime Minister implements a 
coercive foreign policy threat (M= .91 for economic sanctions, M= .37 for military 
intervention). Likewise, the largest drops in approval occur when the Prime Minister is 
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inconsistent in non-salient crises (∆ has a mean of -6.31 for sanctions and a mean of -
4.27 for military action). This is in line with the H3.a as it suggests that in salient crises 
approval increases when military or economic coercion is implemented and decreases 
after a Prime Minister reneges on a threat to impose economic sanctions. The fact that 
single largest drop in approval occurs following the Prime Minister reneging on 
economic coercion (∆ has a mean of -6.31 for sanctions) lends some support for H3.b. 
There is no support for H3.c, as inconsistency is punished across the board in the British 
sample.  
 
4.2.3. Summary of Results for the British Student Sample  
The concept of audience costs travels well across the Atlantic. Britons tend to 
prefer the implementation of economic sanctions over engaging in military action more 
than Americans. The approval the Prime Minister is awarded in times of international 
crises depends on how salient the crisis is (supporting the notion of a rally ‘round the 
flag phenomenon) and on whether she acts consistently.   
 
4.3. Summary of Results and Cross-National Comparison  
I find important similarities across the American and British student samples as 
inconsistent Presidents and Prime Ministers are at risk of paying audience costs when 
they back down on their foreign policy threats. I also find an interesting difference –the 
role played by the public’s foreign policy preferences in attenuating the effect executive 
inconsistency can have on popular support during times of crises. When evaluating the 
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cost an executive should pay for inconsistent behavior, Americans consider whether they 
agreed with the policy that was not enacted in a way that Britons don’t. If the executive 
committed to sending American troops in a non-salient crisis and then backs down her 
approval is not affected. On the other hand, inconsistent British Prime Ministers will 
always pay a cost.31 Even considering that British citizens clearly prefer the imposition 
of economic sanctions to the use of military force, Prime Ministers that do not send 
national troops after having promised to do so will lose popular support (even in non-
salient crises). Table 8 summarizes the supporting evidence for each hypothesis 
evidenced in each sample:  
 
 
Table 8 Cross-National Support for Hypotheses 
American Student Sample British Student Sample H1. Salient crisis → support for 
military or economic coercion. 
Non- salient →support economic 
coercion. 
Supported. Additionally find 
that approval is generally 
higher in salient crises. 
Supported. Additionally find that 
approval is generally higher 
following economic coercion. 
H2. Higher support for consistent 
executives. 
Supported, especially in 
salient crises. 
Supported. 
H3.a. Salient crisis → approval ↑ if 
military or economic coercion are 
consistently enacted; and ↓ 
following inconsistency. 
Supported. Some support. Highest ∆s are after 
consistent military and economic 
action in salient crises and lowest 
∆s are after backing down in non-
salient crises. 
H3.b. Non- salient → approval ↑ if 
economic coercion is consistently 
enacted; and ↓ following 
inconsistency. 
Supported. Some support. The lowest value for 
∆ occurs after failing to carry out 
an economic threat in a non-salient 
crisis. 
H3.c. Non- salient → approval ↓ if 
military coercion is consistently 
enacted. 
Supported. Not Supported. Inconsistency is 
always punished. 
   
  
                                                 
31
 Of course the consequences of a loss in popular support are different in presidential and parliamentary 
systems. 
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5. NATIONAL SAMPLE 
 
 
The hypotheses presented in the theory section were tested by conducting an 
experiment with three different samples. The first two studies were conducted with 
student samples in the United States and in the United Kingdom; the third was 
conducted with a sample of representative American adults. In this section I present the 
results for the study conducted with the national sample. The experimental design is the 
same as the one presented in the cross-national comparison section, thus, I will not 
repeat it here. The research materials are similar but not identical. I first describe the 
modifications done to the research materials for this study, and then present the results. I 
conclude the section by summarizing the findings and describing the effect participants’ 
political affiliation has on the results.32  
 
Changes Made to the Research Material: The web-based experiment was framed as a 
study of American foreign policy.33 The three experiments designed to test my theory of 
accountability in international relations test the same hypotheses and therefore have 
equivalent designs. However, I introduced some changes in the research material 
members of the national sample were exposed to. Changes were implemented to 
                                                 
32
 Whether participants identify with the Democratic or the Republican does not significantly change the 
effects the three experimental factors have on executive approval. 
33
 For full text of the experimental scenarios please see the Appendix.  
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improve on the previous materials and strengthen the experiment. The changes and the 
rationale behind them are:  
(1) The most important modification was that I no longer mentioned if national 
economic interests were at stake when introducing the salience of a crisis. This 
change was introduced as a realization that national economic interests and 
security interests will not necessarily move in tandem. Salient scenarios were 
introduced by mentioning that, “Uzbekistan, the country that has been invaded, 
has abundant mines of high quality uranium that can be used for the development 
of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan, the invading country has a history of 
supporting anti-Western and anti-U.S. terrorist groups. A victory by the 
attacking country would constitute a severe risk to U.S. national security." 
Participants exposed to non salient-crises read that, "If Kazakhstan’s military 
forces do take over their neighbor, it will pose no threat to U.S. national 
security. However, these actions constitute a clear violation of international law 
as chartered by the United Nations.” 
(2) The analyses of the manipulation checks for the experiments conducted with 
student samples shows that participants generally understood the independent 
variables as intended. However, the manipulation check for the experimental 
factor “Salience of Crisis” was not as well comprehended as the other two 
experimental factors. I believe that the way the manipulation check was 
measured contributed to the relatively higher misunderstanding of this 
manipulation. Given this possibility, in the nationally representative sample I 
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measured this item using an 11-point scale, instead of using the binary measure I 
employ in the previous studies.  
(3) Given the importance the salience of crises has in my theory, I decided to include 
a second manipulation check designed to function as an alternative measure. If 
respondent’s answers to both manipulation checks are correct, that provides 
further reassurance that the salience of crises was introduced convincingly in the 
experimental scenarios. Participants responded to the question, “How threatening 
is the situation described to the U.S.?” on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not 
threatening at all) to 10 (very threatening).34 
 
5.1. The Experiment 
Six hundred and fifty seven American adults participated in the experiment, 
fielded by Knowledge Networks in November of 2011.35 Knowledge Networks is an 
online survey source used in both government and academic research. They routinely 
conduct web-based experiments on a probability-based panel that is representative of the 
American population. Participants are recruited from a published sample frame of 
residential addresses that covers approximately 98% of American households.36  
                                                 
34
 Given the similarity this item shares with the manipulation check that asks whether the crisis was salient 
or not, it was placed near the beginning of the post-experimental questionnaire to avoid the answer to one 
item influencing the answer of the other. The correlation between both variables is .583, p-value=.000 
35
 The experiment was funded by the National Science Foundation grant number SES-1123291, as well as 
by the Program of International Conflict and Cooperation (PICC) at Texas A&M University.  
36
 Members of the Knowledge Networks panel are initially sent a letter informing them that they have been 
selected to participate. They then have a telephone recruitment interview, where they are informed that 
they have been selected to participate in the Knowledge Networks panel. They are also informed that if the 
household does not have internet Knowledge Networks will provide them with a webTV set-top box with 
free access to internet in return for answering weekly surveys. Panel members then provide Knowledge 
Networks with their email accounts and receive weekly surveys via email. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. I 
ensure that randomization truly took place by conducting a multinomial logistic 
regression checking whether demographic characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, income and political affiliation predicted the assignment of participants to 
experimental conditions.37 The results support the notion that randomization effectively 
occurred and the different values obtained for the dependent variables are causally 
linked to the experimental factors.38  
 
5.2. Internal Validity of the Experimental Procedure 
Overall, analyzes of the main study show that the majority of participants understood 
the values of the independent variables as intended. The effects of each independent 
variable on the pertinent manipulation check are statistically significant (each with a p-
value of .000). The data on each individual experimental factor are: 
(a) Salience of the International Crises: A first manipulation check asked 
participants to rate the salience of the crisis they read about on an 11-point scale. 
The mean value for this manipulation check for those exposed to salient crises 
scenarios was 6.91, while the mean for those exposed to non-salient crises was 
4.99. A second item was designed to measure the difference between crises that 
were salient and those that were not in a less direct way. Participants were asked 
how threatening the situation described was to the U.S., also on an 11-point 
                                                 
37
 This is the same procedure conducted by Levendusky and Horowitz (2012). 
38
 The only factor that is statistically significant is ethnicity in the likelihood of being assigned to the 
eighth experimental condition (there are less whites in this condition). See Appendix 4 for the results of 
the randomization check.    
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scale. As with the other manipulation checks, participants responses to this item 
were also determined by the scenario they read about (p-value=.000). The mean 
value for those exposed to salient crises scenarios was 6.86, while the mean for 
those exposed to crises that were not salient was 3.77. 
(b) Foreign Policy Threat: Participants were asked what the President said he was 
going to do in the report they had read. They could respond that he announced he 
was going to implement economic sanctions (coded as 0) or that he had 
announced that the U.S. was going to send troops to stop the aggressors (coded 
as 1). The mean value for the economic coercion was .13. The mean value for the 
military coercion scenario was .92. If 100% of participants had comprehended 
this manipulation check the mean value for participants who read the economic 
coercion scenario would have been 0 and the mean for those exposed to a 
military coercion would be 1.  
(c) Executive Consistency: The final item in the questionnaire asked what the 
President ended up doing in the report they just read about. Participants could 
answer the President had implemented sanctions, sent U.S. troops or done 
nothing. Responses were later recoded into a binary measure where 1 = 
consistently implemented the promised coercive foreign policy, and 0 = no 
policy was implemented, and therefore the executive was inconsistent. The mean 
for scenarios in which participants were exposed to a consistent executive was 
.89. The mean value for scenarios where the executive acted inconsistently 
was.13. If every participant had understood this manipulation check correctly the 
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mean for those who read about an executive being consistent would be 1, 
whereas the mean for an inconsistent executive would be 0. 
 
5.3. Results 
The general pattern of findings shows that the salience of an international crisis 
affects constituents’ preferences for coercive foreign policies.39 These policy preferences 
in turn affect whether inconsistent leaders rewarded or punished. I find that executives 
who act in accordance to the policy preferences of their constituents receive more 
support in times of international crises and that executive inconsistency is not always 
punished.  
 
(H1) Does the Salience of an International Crisis Affect Policy Preferences?  
To assess whether participants’ evaluation of executives who threatened and 
implemented economic or military coercion was contingent to the salience of an 
international crisis, a 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA was conducted on executive 
approval after the President had implemented either economic or military coercion.40 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Individual policy preferences are measured indirectly through measures of executive approval after the 
executive has committed to economic or military coercive foreign policies.  
40
 H1 tests policy preferences only, and not reactions to executive inconsistency. Therefore responses 
provided to cases in which the executive was inconsistent, i.e. when a coercive foreign policy was 
threatened but not implemented, were not included in the analyses presented in this section. These cases 
are included in the sample with which H2 and H3 are tested.  
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Table 9 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for National Sample 
Observations: 318 R-Squared = .836 Adj R-Squared = .834 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 14450.667 4 3612.667 399.804 .000 
Salience of Crisis 85.541 1 85.541 9.467 .002 
Foreign Policy Threat 27.645 1 27.645 3.059 .081 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy 
Threat 
143.521 1 143.521 15.883 .000 
Residual 2837.333 314 9.036  
Total 17288.000 318  
 
 
 
Table 9 shows a main effect of both Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat 
on domestic support for the executive in times of international conflict. Executive 
approval is higher (M=7.23) when an international crisis is salient, when compared to 
approval in a non-salient crisis (M=6.19) [F(1,318)=9.467, p=.002]. When an 
international crisis threatens national security, citizens are predisposed to approve of the 
President regardless of her actual response to the crisis. This lends support to the “rally 
‘round the flag” thesis (Mueller 1971). In the words of one participant, “I do not wish to 
see the US entering into another war or intervening in another country. However, when 
the US and other countries’ security are threatened by terrorists and/or their supporters, I 
believe the US must get involved.41”Another claimed that, “the US does not need to 
have these idiots develop a nuclear weapon. Stop the problem before one develops, 
instead of acting in (self) defense. The week will inherit nothing.42” 
The type of Foreign Policy Threat made by the executive is on the verge of 
statistical significance [F(1,318)=3.059, p=.081]. Generally speaking, when the 
President engages in economic coercion approval tends to be higher (M=7.01) than when 
                                                 
41As is standard practice in survey experiments conducted by Knowledge Networks, after answering the 
experimental items participants can voice their opinion about the survey.  
42
 This last sentence was written in capital letters. 
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using military might (M=6.42). This main effect is qualified by the significant 
interaction between both experimental factors. One respondent notes that, “It was a good 
idea to use economic sanctions instead of sending troops right away.” 
In line with H1 the analyses show a significant two-way interaction between 
Salience of Crisis and the Foreign Policy Threat [F(1,318)=15.883, p=.000]. That is, 
although people generally prefer the implementation of less costly coercive foreign 
policies such as imposing economic sanctions, military alternatives are supported when 
national security is at stake. In the words of one respondent, “sanctions on all levels are 
ineffective. It’s like smacking the person on the wrist and it will not prevent that person 
or country from doing what they want to do. If you want to stop a country from doing 
something you don’t want it to do you must wage war.” As seen in Figure 7, approval 
for the president is high after a commitment to send troops is made (M=7.61) and when 
sanctions are threatened (M=6.86) in salient crises. On the other hand, when a crisis is 
not salient, domestic audiences prefer the implementation of sanctions (M=7.16) to 
sending troops (M=5.23).43  
                                                 
43
 T-test results show that the difference of means between executive approval following economic and 
military coercion in salient crises is not statistically significant (a two-tailed test has a p-value of .193). 
The difference between both types of coercion is statistically significant in non-salient crises (a two-tailed 
t-test has a p-value of .002). This means that the statistical significance of the two-way interaction between 
Salience of Crisis and the Foreign Policy Threat is driven by the differences in non-salient crises only.  
 94 
 
6.86
7.16
7.61
5.23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
salient non-salient
A
p
p
r
o
v
a
l
sanctions troops
 
Figure 7 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat on Approval for National Sample 
 
 
 
(H2) Is Executive Inconsistency Punished Across the Board? 
To assess whether approval for consistent executives is higher than approval for 
inconsistent ones, I conducted two 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVAs. The first was 
conducted on executive approval measured after the President had either followed 
through or backed down on threats of military or economic coercion. The second was 
conducted on a measure called ∆. ∆ is the difference in executive approval that allows 
me to examine whether executive approval increased or decreased for each individual 
participant. This measure is calculated by subtracting the executive approval each 
participant awarded the executive after she acted consistently or inconsistently from the 
approval they had previously awarded her after a coercive foreign policy threat was first 
issued.  
Descriptively, the highest means for the first approval measure are observed in 
salient crises when the executive consistently intervened militarily (M=7.61) and in non-
salient crises when the executive consistently imposed sanctions (M=7.16). The lowest 
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means are observed when the executive threatens economic coercion and subsequently 
reneges (M=3.80 in salient crises, M=4.12 in non-salient ones). 
Interestingly, most ∆ values are negative, implying that executives have higher 
approval when making an initial foreign policy threat than after having had the chance to 
implement or renege on it. As was the case for the first approval variable, the highest 
means for ∆ are observed in salient crises when the executive consistently intervened 
militarily (M=.68) and in crises that are not salient when the executive consistently 
imposed sanctions (M=.30). This indicates that executive approval increases in these 
cases after participants learn that the executive carried out the coercive foreign policies 
she had threatened. That is, the largest increases in ∆ occur when the executive 
consistently implemented policies that are preferred by the public given the salience of a 
crisis. The largest drops in ∆ occur when the executive is inconsistent in salient crises 
(M= -2.28 for military coercion, M= -3.73 for economic coercion).  
 
 
Table 10 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on Approval for 
National Sample 
Observations: 639 R-Squared = . 784 Adj R-Squared = . 781 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 21055.473 8 2631.934 286.458 .000 
Salience of Crisis 17.289 1 17.289 1.882 .171 
Foreign Policy Threat 13.770 1 13.770 1.499 .221 
Executive Consistency 741.249 1 741.249 80.677 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy Threat 66.052 1 66.052 7.189 .008 
Salience of Crisis* Executive Consistency 79.630 1 79.630 8.667 .003 
Foreign Policy Threat* Executive Consistency 124.267 1 124.267 13.525 .000 
Three-way interaction 77.747 1 77.747 8.462 .004 
Residual 5797.527 631 9.188  
Total 26853.000 639  
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Table 11 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on ∆ for National 
Sample 
Observations: 632 R-Squared = .207 Adj R-Squared = .196 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob. > F 
Model 2054.719 8 256.840 20.310 .000 
Salience of Crisis 141.969 1 141.969 11.226 .001 
Foreign Policy Threat 200.521 1 200.521 15.856 .000 
Executive Consistency 774.686 1 774.686 61.258 .000 
Salience of Crisis*Foreign Policy Threat .872 1 .872 .069 .793 
Salience of Crisis* Executive Consistency 151.959 1 151.959 12.016 .001 
Foreign Policy Threat* Executive Consistency 96.639 1 96.639 7.642 .006 
Three-way interaction 45.208 1 45.208 3.575 .059 
Residual 7891.281 624 12.646  
Total 9946.000 632  
 
 
 
Table 10 and Table 11 show the different effects the experimental factors have 
on both approval measures. The main effects of Executive Consistency and the 
interactions between this variable and Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat test 
H2 as they assess the effect of executive consistency/inconsistency on approval. The 
interaction between Salience of Crisis and Foreign Policy Threat refers to rewarding or 
punishing the executive for not implementing public policy preferences and was already 
discussed in the test for H1.44 The three-way interaction among the independent 
variables tests H3, as it examines the effects particular policy preferences have on 
executive approval following inconsistent behavior, and will therefore be addressed in 
the following section.  
Table 10 and Table 11 show a main effect of Executive Consistency on domestic 
support for the executive in analyses run with both approval measures. The results 
indicate that executives who act consistently and implement the coercive foreign policies 
                                                 
44
 The p-values for this interaction in Table 10 and Table 9 differ slightly as the results in Table 9 are 
limited to only those cases in which the executive acted consistently.  
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they threaten have higher approval ratings (M=6.71) than those who back down on such 
threats (M=4.55) [F(1,639)=80.677, p=.000]. A significant number of respondents noted 
angry comments when exposed to inconsistent executives. One noted that, “you can’t 
say one thing and then change your mind. The weaker people were counting on the 
troops the President said he would send. Then he changed his mind. This means to me 
that anything he says is a lie.” Another claimed, “we must follow through on what we 
say. If we say we’ll send troops we must. Thus we must be careful not to say something 
we don’t really mean. Never should our country say one thing and then do the opposite. 
It makes America appear weak and indecisive, just what our enemies want.” ∆ values are 
also higher for consistent executives (M= .19) than for inconsistent ones (M= -2.04) 
[F(1,632)=61.258, p=.000]. That is, inconsistent executives are punished for backing 
down after issuing economic or military threats in crises that are salient and that are not 
salient. These main effects support H2 and are qualified by two important interactions.  
First, the interaction between Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency 
significantly affects executive approval and ∆. That is, although executive inconsistency 
is punished across the board, the salience of the crisis at hand influences how much of an 
audience cost will be paid. As can be seen in Figure 8, in a salient crisis the difference in 
approval for consistent (M=7.23) and inconsistent Presidents (M=4.36) is twice the 
difference than in non-salient ones (M=6.19 for consistent executives, M=4.74 for 
inconsistent ones) [F(1,639)=8.667, p=.003]. In the case of ∆ we find that approval 
increases when executives act consistently in both salient and non-salient scenarios (M= 
.20 for salient crises, .17 for ones that are not salient) and diminishes when executives 
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back down (M= -3.01 for salient crises, - 1.07 for ones that are not salient). The decline 
in approval for inconsistent executives is approximately three times larger when a crisis 
threatens national security.  
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Figure 8 Effects of Salience of Crisis and Executive Consistency on Approval for National Sample 
 
 
 
The second interaction that qualifies how domestic audiences punish inconsistent 
leaders in times of international crises is that between Foreign Policy Threat and 
Executive Consistency [F(1,639)=13.525, p=.000]. Results for the first accountability 
measure show that executive inconsistency is punished more severely in cases of 
economic coercion than in militarized disputes. As illustrated by Figure 9, in these cases 
the difference in approval for consistent Presidents (M=7.01) and for those that renege 
on sanctions (M=3.96) more than doubles the difference between consistent (M=6.42) 
and inconsistent leaders (M=5.14) in cases of military coercion. ∆ results are very 
similar [F(1,632)=7.642, p=.006]. The difference in approval for cases of economic 
coercion is 300% steeper (M= .01 for consistent executives, M= -3.00 for inconsistent 
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ones) than the difference for consistent (M= .36) and inconsistent Presidents (M= -1.08) 
engaging in military coercion.  
There are two plausible explanations for the finding that may, at first glance, 
seem counterintuitive. On the one hand, it is feasible that the lower the execution costs 
associated with a coercive foreign policy are, the higher the domestic political costs will 
be for reneging.  Reneging after committing to a foreign policy that will be costly in 
terms of lives and treasure can be perceived as having a positive effect, as these costs 
will be avoided. However, reneging after threatening the imposition of sanctions, which 
is relatively less costly than military action, is not accompanied by this positive 
externality. On the other hand, people prefer the executive to impose sanctions than to 
intervene militarily (as described in the section testing H1). In this sense this interaction 
supports my theoretical argument as constituents will punish executive inconsistency 
considering whether the action the executive failed to implement is something they 
wanted to see implemented in the first place.  
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Figure 9 Effects of Foreign Policy Threat and Executive Consistency on Approval for National Sample 
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(H3) How do Policy Preferences Affect Accountability?   
In this section I examine whether the preferences for specific coercive foreign 
policies given the salience of a crisis affect the likelihood that executive consistency will 
be rewarded or that executive inconsistency will be punished. The three-way interactions 
between Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency presented 
in Tables 10 and 1 show that these factors have a significant joint effect on executive 
approval [F(1,639)=8.462, p=.004] and on ∆, [F(1,632)=3.575, p=.059]. These 
interactions are graphed in Figures 10 and 11.  
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Figure 10 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on Approval for 
National Sample 
 
 
 
-4.0
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
sanctions troops sanctions troops
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 A
p
p
ro
v
a
l
backed down followed through
 
Figure 11 Effects of Salience of Crisis, Foreign Policy Threat, and Executive Consistency on ∆ for 
National Sample 
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The results support H3.a. In salient crises approval for executives that enact 
military or economic coercion is high. The highest mean for executive approval is for 
presidents that consistently enact military action in salient crises (M=7.61). The mean 
for economic coercion (M=6.86) is statistically indistinguishable from the military 
coercion mean.45 Although military action receives marginally higher popular support 
when a crisis threatens national security, threatening economic coercion provides the 
executive with enough popular support in times of international crises. Inconsistency is 
punished for both military (M=4.93) and economic coercion (M=3.80). When a crisis 
affects national security constituents expect the executive to take action. Says one 
respondent exposed to a salient scenario in which the executive backed down, “the 
leader of a country is supposed to represent the values, morals and ethics of its citizens. 
The leader represented here lied, sold out the values and ethics of the people he 
represented.”  
In salient crises the highest ∆ also is for presidents that intervene militarily 
(M=.68). On the other hand, ∆ for executives that impose sanctions in salient crisis is 
low (M= -.28). However, this result should be interpreted considering that executives 
who threaten economic coercion see their approval rise significantly at the time the 
threat is made (recall there was a main effect of Foreign Policy Threat on executive 
approval in the section testing H1 as participants generally preferred sanctions over 
sending troops). Specifically, executive approval averaged 7.01 when a threat to 
implement sanctions was made so in this particular case a low negative digit implies that 
                                                 
45
 T –test results show that these means are not statistically different (p-value = .883). 
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approval dropped somewhat but remains quite high. As was the case for executive 
approval, analyses of ∆ also show that Presidents that are inconsistent will pay audience 
costs if they renege on military and economic threats made in salient crises. ∆ values are 
negative and large following executive inconsistency in cases of military (M= -2.20) and 
economic coercion (M=-3.73).  
Results also support H3.b. In crises that are not salient executive approval is high 
after sanctions are implemented (M=7.16). ∆ is low but positive (M= .03). Executives 
who commit to imposing sanctions and subsequently renege pay audience costs (M= 
4.12). ∆ for executives that are inconsistent after threatening sanctions is negative and 
large (M= -2.26).  
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that, as predicted, executive inconsistency will not 
always be punished. When an executive threatens troop deployment in a crisis that does 
not pose a direct threat to national security and subsequently backs down, her approval 
will be slightly higher (M=5.36) than it would have been had she followed through on 
her threat (M=5.23), which supports H3.c. Values for ∆ also suggest that executive 
inconsistency is not punished when military action is threatened but not implemented in 
crises that are not salient. ∆ for consistent and inconsistent executives is practically 
indistinguishable (M= .12 for inconsistent Presidents, M=.04 for consistent ones) when 
military coercion is threatened in crises that do not threaten national security. When the 
executive commits to military action in a crisis her constituents perceive as not being 
salient and backs down she will not be held accountable for being inconsistent, as her 
actions would be representing popular preferences. As noted by participants exposed to 
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such scenarios, “the President was quick with the lip, I assume his bark was to curtail the 
aggressor, but in failing he backed off, thankfully,” “I’m sure he had reasons for what 
was done, sometimes things are done behind closed doors that we don’t see.” 
 
5.4. Summary of Results  
When an international crisis poses a threat to national security, the public will 
support executives that intervene militarily or impose economic sanctions. When a crisis 
does not pose such a threat, economic coercion will receive higher levels of public 
support. Inconsistent executives will pay higher costs for backing down in salient crises, 
but the loss in popular support following inconsistent actions in crises that are not salient 
can also be detrimental come election time. Regarding economic coercion, executives 
who commit to imposing sanctions and do not deliver will be punished, even when a 
crisis does not affect national security.      
The salience of a crisis also affects whether executive actions will be rewarded. 
Issuing foreign policy threats can be costly but can also increase popular support in 
times of international conflict. Executives who make coercive foreign policy threats in 
salient crises (particularly those who commit to military action) and those who impose 
sanctions in non-salient ones will see their approval ratings surge, as these actions 
represent the policy preferences of their constituents.   
I find that inconsistent executives will not always pay audience costs for being 
inconsistent. When the executive reneges on a foreign policy threat that domestic 
audiences do not consider an adequate response to an international crisis, domestic 
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political costs may not exist. Unlike research that has highlighted the preponderant role 
executive and elite cues have in times of conflict, I find that domestic audiences are not 
blank slates. If the executive commits to military action and subsequently backs down in 
a crisis that does not pose a direct threat to national security, her approval will remain 
untarnished. 
I would like to address the role of political affiliation. First and foremost, the 
multinomial logistic regression I conducted to ensure that participants were randomly 
assigned to the different experimental scenarios shows that Democrats and Republicans 
were evenly distributed across conditions. Second, the inclusion of political affiliation 
does not significantly change the effects the independent variables have on executive 
approval. However, although participants know they are being exposed to hypothetical 
scenarios, I find that Democrats tend to approve of the executive more (M=5.93 
compared to M=5.14 for Republicans) [F(1,635)=9.768, p=.002]. As can be seen in 
Figure 12, I also find that political affiliation has an interactive effect with Executive 
Consistency [F(1,635)=4.315, p=.038]. Although both Democrats and Republicans 
punish executive inconsistency, Republican’s approval for the executive decreases more 
when the President does not follow through on her coercive policy threats.  
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Figure 12 Effects of Political Affiliation and Salience of Crisis on Approval 
 
 
The three-way interaction among Foreign Policy Threat, Executive Consistency 
and Political Affiliation also affects approval [F(1,635)=3.733, p=.054]. Figure 13 shows 
that inconsistent executives pay audience costs across the board. As mentioned above, 
Democratic executive approval ratings tend to be higher than Republican ones. Also, 
Democrats tend to favor executives who consistently impose sanctions (M=6.67), 
whereas Republicans prefer executives that follow through on military threats (M=6.53). 
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Figure 13 Effects of Political Affiliation, Foreign Policy Threat and Salience of Crisis on Approval 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In times of crises, executives do not make foreign policy threats in a vacuum. 
When answering the question, “Under which circumstances will domestic audiences 
reward or penalize leaders for their coercive foreign policies behavior?” we must 
consider not only what the executive threatened and how she acted, but also what 
constituents’ preferences are. The findings presented in this dissertation show that the 
salience of an international crisis determines when domestic audiences will prefer 
military or economic coercion and that they will support executives who act in 
accordance to these preferences. Executives who display behavior that is incongruent 
with constituents’ preferences will be penalized. When an international crisis poses a 
threat to national security, the public will support executives that intervene militarily or 
impose economic sanctions because both policy options are congruent with public 
preferences. When a crisis does not pose such a threat, domestic audiences prefer 
economic coercion, and thus economic threats will receive higher levels of public 
support.  
The theoretical problem this dissertation addresses is the lack of consensus that 
exists in the field regarding the specific role constituents’ preferences can potentially 
play in fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies. By 
specifying the role public policy preferences and executive inconsistencies can play in 
coercive foreign policies this dissertation brings together two previously unconnected 
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types of accountability theories in international relations. On the one hand, a group of 
theories emphasizes how citizens hold leaders accountable if they do not represent their 
policy preferences. On the other hand, theories of audience costs emphasize whether 
leaders act consistently between what they promise they will do and the foreign policies 
they actually implement. Bridging these areas of research allowed me to expand the 
concept of audience costs to crises that are not salient and to cases of economic coercion. 
Thus, the theory I set forth in this dissertation integrates two approaches to 
accountability and expands the applicability of the concept of audience costs to cases 
that go beyond the original scope outlined by Fearon in the mid 90s. This is a timely 
expansion of the concept for both theoretical and practical reasons.  
Theoretically, prominent scholars of international relations have recently 
questioned that audience costs will operate when the threat a leader backs down from is 
not in line with the preferences of domestic audiences (Snyder and Borghard 2011; 
Trachtenberg 2012). Some qualitative evidence showing that leaders backing down from 
militarized threats are not punished when domestic audiences do not have hawkish 
tendencies have been presented, but to the best of my knowledge this dissertation is the 
first systematic quantitative study to examine the connections between public 
expectations and leaders’ actions. I present a theory that specifies when domestic 
audiences will prefer economic or military coercion and posit that we can predict when 
audience costs will be paid by examining the interaction between popular expectations 
for national action and the actions of the executive. By adding public expectations to the 
equation, my theory predicts there will be cases in which leaders’ inconsistent behavior 
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in times of crises will not lead to audience costs. If an American executive commits to 
military action and subsequently backs down in a crisis that does not pose a direct threat 
to national security, her approval will remain untarnished. This finding has important 
implications for conflict literature in international relations. If the potential for incurring 
audience costs may not exist for democratic leaders engaged in militarized disputes over 
issues that do not threaten national security, these leaders lose the bargaining advantage 
conflict scholars have assumed they have over autocratic ones. 
From a policy point of view, expanding the concept of audience costs to crises 
that do not pose a direct threat to national security and to cases of economic coercion is 
timely because such cases play an important role in today’s post-Cold War world. Many 
of the international conflicts the United States and European states like the United 
Kingdom currently deal with pose no imminent threat to national security and economic 
coercion has risen exponentially since World War I (Pape 1997; Drury 2001). 
Identifying when audience costs will and will not operate can help us understand why 
threats made by democratic leaders have varying degrees of effectiveness. Military 
threats made by western leaders against Libyan or Syrian authorities might not be as 
credible as previously thought.46   
In what follows I summarize the tests of assumptions and of the theory that rests 
on these assumptions. I then proceed to briefly present findings suggesting that 
                                                 
46
 While it is plausible that a lack of credibility might help explain Gaddafi and al-Assad’s resistance to 
make significant concessions in order to avoid military intervention, I am not claiming this is the only or 
even the most relevant explanation for their behavior in these crises. I cannot do justice here to the 
literature dedicated to understanding how incentive structures in personalistic autocratic regimes motivate 
leaders to try to retain power for as long as possible (Huntington 1991; Geddes 1999) and how dictators 
that make concessions risk losing office.  
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constituents’ concern for national reputation influences executive approval across 
samples. After describing how this dissertation contributes to the accountability and 
audience costs literature, I identify areas of future research.  
 
6.1. Summary of Results 
I initially tested the hypothesis derived from my theory on a sample of 451 
American students and 114 British students and found that domestic audiences reward 
and punish leaders both in the U.S. and the U.K. Inconsistent executives are at risk of 
paying audience costs when they back down on their foreign policy threats. This is 
particularly the case in the U.K. as executive inconsistency is always punished, 
regardless of the salience of a crisis and of the match or mismatch between public 
expectations and the actions of the Prime Minister. When evaluating whether to punish 
inconsistent behavior, Americans consider whether they agreed with the policy that was 
not enacted in a manner consistent with my theory. However, British citizens do not. If 
an American President threatened to send American troops in a non-salient crisis and 
then backs down she will not pay audience costs. This is not the case in Britain. Even if 
British citizens generally prefer not to employ military coercion, Prime Ministers that do 
not send national troops after having promised to will be held accountable, even if the 
crisis poses no threat to national security. Overall, I find support for my three hypotheses 
amongst American students, but support only for two hypotheses in the British sample. 
Table 12 lists the hypotheses and shows whether they were supported in each sample.  
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Table 12 Support for Hypotheses across Samples 
American National 
Sample 
American Student 
Sample 
British Student 
Sample 
 
 
H1. Salient crisis → support 
for military or economic 
coercion. 
Non- salient →support 
economic coercion. 
Supported. Additionally 
find that approval is 
generally higher in 
salient crises and 
following economic 
coercion. 
Supported. Additionally 
find that approval is 
generally higher in 
salient crises. 
Supported. 
Additionally find that 
approval is generally 
higher following 
economic coercion. 
H2. Higher support for 
consistent executives. 
Supported, especially in 
salient crises and in cases 
of economic coercion. 
Supported, especially in 
salient crises. 
Supported, regardless 
of type of coercion or 
salience of crisis. 
H3.a. Salient crisis → 
approval ↑ if military or 
economic coercion are 
consistently enacted; and ↓ 
following inconsistency. 
Supported. Supported. Some support. Highest 
∆s are after consistent 
military and economic 
action in salient crises 
and lowest ∆s are after 
backing down in non-
salient crises. 
H3.b. Non- salient → 
approval ↑ if economic 
coercion is consistently 
enacted; and ↓ following 
inconsistency. 
Supported. Supported. Some support. The 
lowest value for ∆ 
occurs after failing to 
carry out an economic 
threat in a non-salient 
crisis. 
H3.c. Non- salient → 
approval ↓ if military 
coercion is consistently 
enacted. 
Supported. Supported. Not Supported. 
Inconsistency is 
always punished. 
 
 
 
The findings of a national experiment conducted with a representative sample of 
657 American adults also support my theory. Non-student Americans tended to behave 
similarly to Americans in the student sample regarding the interaction between popular 
preferences and the actions of the President. Both samples evaluated the actions of the 
executive taking into consideration their own policy preferences. Thus, executive 
inconsistency did not always lead to audience costs. When the President reneged on a 
foreign policy threat that domestic audiences did not agree with, she was spared 
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audience costs. If the executive committed to military action and subsequently backed 
down in a non-salient crisis her approval remained untarnished.   
There was however, a slight difference between student and non-student 
Americans regarding policy preferences. This difference does not counter my theory but 
might be of interest. I find that in the national sample, American adults tend to prefer the 
use of economic sanctions to military intervention across the board (as did British 
students), whereas participants in the American student sample did not generally prefer 
one type of coercive foreign policy to the other. However, in both samples Americans 
preferred using either economic or military coercion in salient crises while privileging 
the use of economic coercion in crises that did not threaten national security as predicted 
by my theory.   
 The objective of the theory set forth in this dissertation is to answer four 
questions: (1) Are democratic leaders rewarded and punished for acting in ways that do 
not represent constituents’ coercive foreign policy preferences? (2) What determines 
popular preferences for military and economic coercive foreign policies in times of 
international crises? (3) Are leaders rewarded and punished for backing down after 
threatening military and economic coercive foreign policies in times of international 
crises, even if a crisis does not threaten national security? (4) Do public coercive foreign 
policy preferences affect whether democratic leaders are rewarded and punished for 
backing down after issuing threats in times of international crises? The answer to the 
second question was the same across the three samples with which I tested my theory, 
which totaled 1,222 participants overall. I find that the salience of an international crisis 
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determines whether the public will support the use of either economic or military 
coercion or will only prefer the imposition of economic sanctions. The answers to the 
other questions were the same amongst Americans, but not for British citizens. 
Regarding questions (1) and (3) I find that American Presidents are rewarded and 
punished for acting in ways that do not represent constituents’ coercive foreign policy 
preferences and executive inconsistency will be punished in non-salient crises when 
economic sanctions had been threatened. Regarding the fourth question, I find that if the 
President backs down after making a threat that did not represent popular preferences, 
she will not pay audience costs as domestic audiences will be relieved that a policy they 
did not favor was avoided. British Prime Ministers, on the other hand, will pay audience 
costs across the board, even if this means implementing an unpopular coercive foreign 
policy.  
 
6.2. Contribution to Accountability Literature 
After the Vietnam War, scholars of international relations challenged the 
Almond-Lippmann thesis, claiming that Americans have foreign policy preferences and 
that changes in these preferences were rationally tied to international events (Caspary 
1970; Mueller 1973; Page and Shapiro 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Jentleson 1992; 
Page and Shapiro 1992; Popkin 1994). My dissertation corroborates this claim: in times 
of international crises domestic audiences will consider whether national security is at 
stake when forming a preference for economic or military coercion. The coercive foreign 
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policy statements and actions of the executive will be evaluated in light of their 
correspondence to public preferences.  
 It has been posited that even if citizens do not have a nuanced understanding of 
international affairs, reliance on heuristics or informational shortcuts can enable the 
formation of general foreign policy preferences (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1993; Delli-Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Holsti 2004; 
Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006). Identifying an international crisis as 
salient can operate as such a heuristic. In the absence of more detailed information this 
cue guides the process of public foreign policy preference formation. One important 
caveat is that in my experiments participants were informed about the salience of a crisis 
without discussing who had categorized the crises as salient. That is, my research does 
not address the current debate regarding the direction of the casual arrow between public 
opinion and policy-making. Some scholars emphasize the predominant role of elites in 
framing public opinion (Mermin 1997; Robinson 2000; Entman 2003; Kull, Ramsay and 
Lewis 2004; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Boettcher and Cobb 2009). On the other hand, 
numerous studies support the notion that the casual arrow can be reversed: the public 
does influence policy-making (Page and Shapiro 1983; Nincic 1988; Aldrich, Sullivan 
and Borgida 1989; Russet 1990; Bartels 1991; Nincic and Hinckley 1991; Roberts 1993; 
Mandelbaum 1996; Baum 2004b; Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006). My 
dissertation does not contribute to either perspective.  
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My findings corroborate those of Anand and Krosnick (2003) regarding the role 
public preferences play in evaluating political figures. My unique contribution is 
highlighting how these popular preferences interact with preferences for consistent 
executives. As noted by Levendusky and Horowitz, “audience costs have a distinguished 
intellectual pedigree in international relations research over the past two decades” 
(2012:323) and have been used as the foundation for numerous bargaining models of 
international crises. However, like Levendusky and Horowitz, I, too, find that 
inconsistent executives will not always pay audience costs for being inconsistent.47 
When the executive reneges on a foreign policy threat that domestic audiences do not 
consider an adequate response to an international crisis, domestic political costs may not 
exist. Unlike research that has highlighted the preponderant role executive and elite cues 
have in times of conflict, I find that domestic audiences are not blank slates. 
Previous research in international relations has highlighted the role democratic 
accountability plays in constraining inter-state coercion (Nincic 1988; Russet 1990; 
Holsti 1992; Sobel 2001; Baum 2004b; Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler and Sharp 2006). 
This study shows that the accountability link that exists between constituents and 
executives can constrain coercive foreign policies but also foment them, particularly if 
citizens perceive a crisis as threatening national security. As highlighted previously by 
Baum (2004a) and Clare (2007), the saliency of an international conflict, or whether 
significant national interests are at stake, influences domestic reactions to presidential 
inconsistencies. The findings described in this dissertation help us understand the 
                                                 
47
 Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) find that inconsistency is not punished when the action is framed as 
being a consequence of new information and backing down is presented as being in the national interest. 
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mechanisms through which the perceived salience of a crisis affects these distinct public 
reactions. The salience of an international crisis affects constituents’ foreign policy 
preferences, and executives’ consistent and inconsistent behavior in times of 
international crises will be punished or rewarded considering these preferences.   
Finally, my dissertation addresses recent critiques formulated by Trachtenberg (2012) 
and Snyder and Borghard (2011) claiming that audience costs might not be paid when a 
democratic leader backs down from a military threat if domestic audiences do not have 
hawkish preferences. The theory and experiments set forth in this dissertation 
complement the qualitative evidence provided by these scholars.  
 
6.3. Areas of Future Research  
This dissertation contributes to existing theories of democratic accountability in 
international relations by bridging previously unconnected areas of study and by 
proposing novel connections between public preferences and evaluations of the 
executive in times of international crises. Before concluding this section, I would like to 
address five areas of future study that would complement the research presented here. 
The first three are conceptual issues, whereas the latter two are methodological ones.  
First and foremost, an area that elicits future research is trying to answer the 
question, “Why would constituents disapprove of inconsistent executives or leaders that 
do not act in accordance to their preferences?” I have already begun to investigate this 
issue. It has been posited that concern for national reputation is a micro-mechanism 
behind audience costs and that inconsistent executives lose approval not out of moral or 
 116 
 
ethical concerns, but due to citizens’ instrumental preoccupation with national reputation 
(Tomz 2007). In addition to examining the role concern with national reputation plays in 
rewarding or punishing the executive, I have also begun studying the effects the 
perceived competence of the executive and various emotions elicited by international 
crises play in the evaluation of the executive’s actions.  
 Second, further specification of the relationship that exists between a systemic 
definition of salience and an individual-level definition is warranted. In the theory 
section I specified that a salient crisis was one that constituted a threat to national 
security. However, who defines when national security is threatened? Do individual-
level characteristics such as political knowledge affect the perception of a crisis as 
salient? When an international crisis breaks out there is often a considerable degree of 
discrepancy about whether it threatens national security. How does an objective 
international threat impact the assessment individual citizens make regarding national 
security? How prevalent is the role of foreign policy elites in influencing citizens’ 
perception of the salience of an international crisis? Trager and Vavreck (2011) find that 
elite framing plays a role in determining when audience costs will be paid or avoided. Is 
there a limit to how far elite frames can go in fomenting support for coercive foreign 
policies? As mentioned above, in this project participants were informed of the salience 
of a crisis without knowing who had made such a categorization. Experimental research 
manipulating different sources of information could shed light on the role of elite 
framing in coercive foreign policy.  
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A third area where conceptual clarification is needed is regarding the role 
specific political dynamics play in determining when democratic leaders will be held 
accountable for foreign policy choices. There are two types of relevant dynamics that 
can affect accountability: domestic and international. Scholars have recently begun to 
integrate audience costs theories with theories of domestic political behavior. Trager and 
Vavreck (2011) find that the political affiliation of an executive affects democratic 
accountability. Hawkish executives will receive more support than dovish ones when 
enacting peaceful foreign policies, and conversely, it will be easier for dovish executives 
to foment support for military action. Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) find that how a 
President justifies inconsistent behavior can spare her paying audience costs. Future 
research should address other issues such as the role the political affiliation of the 
executive plays in fomenting the idea that an international crisis poses a threat to 
national security, or in heightening fear of an international opponent in a bargaining 
crisis. Another area where further clarification of how domestic political dynamics can 
affect accountability is needed refers to the relevance international affairs play come 
election time. Even if the public frequently considers foreign issues as being one of the 
most important problems a nation can face (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989; 
Vavreck 2009), can we really believe that foreign policy issues can outweigh domestic 
concerns? President Bush oversaw a quick, decisive victory in the first Iraq War, but 
voters seem more concerned with local economic troubles. Further research identifying 
the thresholds at which international or domestic issues will prevail in determining when 
democratic leaders will be rewarded or punished for coercive foreign policies is needed. 
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At an international level, more studies connecting audience costs with international 
events that occur during a crisis are warranted. Leventoglu and Tarar (2008) have shown 
that interstate bargaining dynamics change significantly depending on the time 
preferences of the players. Depending on this, uncertainty can lead to war or simply to a 
delay in reaching a negotiated settlement. What occurs in the period of time after a threat 
is issued and before the executive follows through or backs down is also relevant to 
accountability research. What if a threat succeeds in making an opponent yield…will 
inconsistency generally lead to audience costs in such cases? What if the nation being 
invaded by a third party is stronger than initially expected when an American leader 
issued a threat to intervene…will inconsistency be punished?  
 Methodologically, one issue is the scarcity of observational data appropriate to 
test theories of democratic accountability. This is the reason most recent audience costs 
studies have been formal theories, experiments, or cases studies. While these types of 
studies are important, observational research is essential in terms of strengthening the 
external validity of audience costs and accountability theories that focus on the role of 
threats. As noted by Downes and Sechser (2012), audience costs theories have been 
predominantly tested with data that is inadequate for such purpose. The Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MID) and the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) datasets do not 
have many threats. According to their estimations, inter-state threats constitute 
approximately 9% of the MID data and 15% of the ICB data (2012:13). Analyses 
conducted with their new dataset of 194 interstate compellent threats issued between 
1918 and 2001 do not support audience costs theory. Would analyses made including 
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deterrent threats support audience costs? Additionally, a comparison of audience costs 
across policy domains that examines real cases of economic and military coercion would 
be a very nice contribution to studies of democratic accountability.  
Another fruitful methodological quest that would allow adequate tests of 
accountability theories with observational data would be to expand Baum’s (2004a) 
‘Going Public’ variable. Baum collected data of presidential public threats issued during 
pre-crisis stages in the United States. To capture whether an executive ‘goes public,’ he 
counted the number of times the President mentioned an opponent state in a national 
security context48 (2004a:615) in the Public Papers of the President of the United 
States49 (1998). From these counts, Baum tallied three different indicators used to 
construct his ‘Going Public’ variable. The first indicator is the average number of times 
an opponent state is mentioned daily since the international crisis began until the day in 
which one of the actors involved in the crisis initiates a major response.50 The second 
indicator is the daily average of these same mentions during the month prior to the date 
on which the crisis began. The third indicator is the daily average number of mentions in 
that same calendar month during the previous year. Baum later averages his second and 
third indicators. This product is his ‘pre-crisis’ average. The difference between this pre-
crisis indicator and his first indicator constitutes his ‘going public’ variable. This allows 
him to control for the fact that some nations just get mentioned more frequently than 
others, so he focuses on the changes in presidential rhetoric. Expanding this data set in 
                                                 
48
 This excludes the times the president mentions a nation in a way that is unambiguously unrelated to a 
specific crisis.  
49
 This includes presidential speeches, press conferences, as well as other written or verbal statements.  
50
 To determine when a crisis begins and ends Baum uses the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. 
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the U.S., and collecting similar indices in the U.K. and other European states would be a 
significant contribution to accountability research in international relations.  
The final methodological issue is that most experimental work analyzing the role 
of audience costs has been conducted in the United States. This dissertation is an initial 
step towards understanding the determinants of domestic audiences punishing leaders for 
carrying out foreign policies that are not in line with their expectations. One future step I 
would like to take is testing the hypotheses set forth in this dissertation on a larger 
sample of non-students in Britain. Additionally, in subsequent studies I wish to examine 
how relative power fits into the public-leader equation. It seems plausible that leaders of 
relatively weaker states in the international system could boost popularity ratings by 
committing to certain types of foreign policies, even if these are not subsequently carried 
out. Although citizens of weaker states were probably not expecting their leader to make 
a public statement when facing an international crisis, they might perceive the 
reputational benefits associated with such action51. Even if leaders of relatively weaker 
states do not follow through on their publicly stated commitments, their approval ratings 
might not drop.  
  
   
 
                                                 
51
 Personally, I have observed that audiences behaved this way when Chilean President Ricardo Lagos sent 
Chilean troops to Haiti in a humanitarian mission. Although in this case Chilean troops were actually sent, 
the numbers were minimal and the public impact very significant. It would be interesting to see if this 
most informal observation of an almost nominal foreign policy action having an important effect on 
citizen’s views of their international standing carries through even if the executive backs down after her 
commitment. 
 121 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Aldrich, J., C. Gelpi, P. Feaver, J. Reifler, and K. Thompson Sharp. 2006. “Foreign 
Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 477–
502. 
Aldrich, J., J. Sullivan, and E. Borgida. 1989. “Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do 
Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience?’” The American Political 
Science Review 83 (1): 123–41. 
Allen, S. 2005. “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure.” 
International Interactions 31: 117–38. 
Almond, G. 1950. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger. 
Almond, G., and S. Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press. 
Anand, S., and J. Krosnick. 2003. “The Impact of Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy on 
Public Preferences Among Presidential Candidates: A Study of Issue Publics and the 
Attentive Public in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election.” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 33: 31–71. 
Anderson, C.J. 2007. “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the 
Limits of Democratic Accountability.” Annual Political Science Review 10: 271–96. 
Arena, P. 2008. “Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and 
Elections.” Conflict Management and Peace Service 25: 136–51. 
 122 
 
Baggot, R. 1992. “The Measurement of Changes in Pressure Group Politics.” Talking 
Politics 5 (1): 19. 
Baldwin, D. 1985. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Barber, J. 1979. “Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument.” International Affairs 55 
(3): 367–84. 
Bartels, L.M. 1991. “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making.” 
American Political Science Review 85: 457–74. 
Baum, M. 2004a. “Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the 
Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48 (5): 603–731. 
———. 2004b. “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of 
Operation Restore Hope.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2): 187–226. 
———. 2002. “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag 
Phenomenon.” International Studies Quarterly 46: 263–98. 
Baum, M., and T. Groeling. 2010. War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public 
Views of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Baum, M., and P. Potter. 2008. “The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 11: 39–65. 
Berinsky, A. 2007. “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public 
Support for Military Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 69 (4): 975–97. 
 123 
 
Berinsky, A., and D.R. Kinder. 2006. “Making Sense of Issues Through Media Frames: 
Understanding the Kosovo Crisis.” Journal of Politics 68: 640–56. 
Bienen, H., and R. Gilpin. 1980. “Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism.” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (1): 89–98. 
Boettcher III, W., and M.D. Cobb. 2009. “Don’t Let Them Die in Vain:  Casualty 
Frames and Public Tolerance for Escalating Commitment in Iraq.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 53 (5): 677–97. 
Brody, R.A., and L. Sigelman. 1983. “Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections: 
An Update and Extension.” Public Opinion Quarterly 47: 325–28. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 2002. “Domestic Politics and International Relations.” 
International Studies Quarterly 46 (1): 1–9. 
———. 2006. Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and 
Perceptions. Washington: CQ Press. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., J. Morrow, R. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. “An Institutional 
Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review 93: 791–
807. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., and R. Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political 
Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” The 
American Political Science Review 89 (4): 841–55. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., R. Siverson, J. Morrow, and A. Smith. 2004. “Testing Novel 
Implications from the Selectorate Theory of  War.” World Politics 56: 363–88. 
 124 
 
Campbell, A., P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, and D.E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. 
New York: Wiley. 
Campbell, J.E. 2004. “The Presidential Election of 2004: The Fundamentals and the 
Campaign.” Forum 2 (4): 1–16. 
Caspary, W.R. 1970. “The Mood Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy.” American Political Science Review 64: 536–47. 
Chiozza, G., and H.E. Goemans. 2003. “Peace Through Insecurity: Tenure and 
International Conflict.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (4): 443–67. 
Clare, J. 2007. “Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests.” The Journal of Politics 69 
(3): 732–45. 
Cohen, B.C. 1973. The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company.  
Cooper, H. 2012. “Sanctions Against Iran Grow Tighter, but What’s the Next Step?” 
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/world/middleeast/iran-
sanctions-grow-tighter-but-whats-next.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. 
Daoudi, M.S., and M.S. Dajani. 1983. Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. 
London: Routledge.  
Davis, D., and B. Silver. 2004. “Civil Liberties Vs. Security: Public Opinion in the 
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America.” American Journal of Political Science 
48 (1): 28–46. 
Delli-Carpini, M., and S. Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It 
Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 125 
 
Dorussen, H., and J. Mo. 2001. “Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-
Seeking as Commitment Strategies.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (4): 395–
429. 
Downes, A., and T. Sechser. 2012. “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility.” 
International Organization 66 (3): 457–89.  
Downs, A. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of 
Political Economy 65 (2): 135–50. 
Drury, A.C. 2001. “Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The U.S. President’s Decision to 
Initiate Economic Sanctions.” Political Research Quarterly 54 (3): 485–508. 
Eland, I. 1995. “Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy.” In Smart Sanctions: 
Targeting Economic Statecraft. D. Cortright and G. Lopez. Plymouth,UK: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
Entman, R.M. 2003. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 
Eyerman, J., and R. Hart. 1996. “An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (4): 597–616. 
Fearon, J. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 
379–414. 
———. 1997. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs.” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68–90. 
Galtung, J. 1967. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples 
from the Case of Rhodesia.” World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. 
 126 
 
Gartner, S.S. 2008. “The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An 
Experimental Approach.” The American Political Science Review 102 (1): 95–106. 
Gartner, S.S., and G.M. Segura. 1998. “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42 (3): 278–300. 
———. 2000. “Race, Opinion, and Casualties in the Vietnam War.” Journal of Politics 
62 (1): 115–46. 
Gartner, S.S., G.M. Segura, and B. Barrat. 2004. “War Casualties, Policy Positions, and 
the Fate of Legislators.” Political Research Quarterly 53 (3): 467–77. 
Gartner, S.S., G.M. Segura, and M. Wilkening. 1997. “All Politics Are Local: Local 
Losses and Individual Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41 (5): 669–94. 
Gaubatz, K.T. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” 
International Organization 50 (1): 109–39. 
Geddes, B. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1): 115–44. 
Gelpi, C., P. Feaver, and J. Reifler. 2005. “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the 
War in Iraq.” International Security 30 (3): 7–46. 
Gelpi, C., and M. Griesdorf. 2001. “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International 
Crises.” The American Political Science Review 95 (3): 633–47. 
Gelpi, C., J. Reifler, and P. Feaver. 2007. “Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective 
Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance.” Political 
Behavior 29 (2): 151–74. 
 127 
 
Geva, N., A. Mintz, and A. Astorino-Courtois. 1996. “Marketing the Peace Process in 
the Middle East: The Effectiveness of Thematic and Evaluative Framing in Jordan 
and Israel.” In Arms Spending, Development and Security. M. Chatterji, J. Fontanel 
and A. Hattori. New Delhi, India: APH Publishing. 
Gleick, P. 1991. “Environment and Security: Clear Connections.” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 47 (3): 17–21. 
Goemans, H.E. 2000. “Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of 
War.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (5): 555–79. 
Goldberg, J. 2012. “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t 
Bluff.’.” The Atlantic. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-
as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/. 
Graebner, N.A. 1983. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: a Pragmatic View.” In 
Interaction: Foreign Policy and Public Policy. D.C. Piper and R.J. Terchek. 
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
Guisinger, A., and A. Smith. 2002. “Honest Threats: The Interactions of Reputation and 
Political Institutions in International Crises.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 
(2): 175–200. 
Haftendorn, H. 1991. “The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in 
International Security.” International Studies Quarterly 35 (1): 3–17. 
 128 
 
Hess, S., and M. Nelson. 1985. “Foreign Policy: Dominance and Decisiveness in 
Presidential Elections.” In The Election of 1984. M. Nelson. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Holsti, O. 1992. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-
Lippmann Consensus.” International Studies Quarterly 36 (4): 439–66. 
———. 2004. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: Univ. 
Michigan Press. 
Homer-Dixon, T. 1991. “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute 
Conflict.” International Security 16 (2): 76–116. 
Huddy, L., S. Feldman, C. Taber, and G. Lahav. 2005. “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of 
Antiterrorism Policies.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 593–608. 
Hufbauer, G.C., J. Schott, K.A. Elliot, and B. Oegg. 2008. Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered. 3rd ed. Washington: The Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. 
Huntington, S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Hurwitz, J., and M. Peffley. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A 
Hierarchical Model.” The American Political Science Review 81 (4): 1099–120. 
Huth, P., and T.L. Allee. 2002. “Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation of 
International Disputes.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (6): 754–890. 
 129 
 
Iyengar, S., and A. Simon. 1993. “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public 
Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing.” Communication 
Research 20 (3): 365–83. 
Jacobs, L.R., and B.I. Page. 2005. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American 
Political Science Review 99 (1): 107–23. 
Jacobs, L.R., and R.Y. Shapiro. 1999. “Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: 
Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (3): 
592–616. 
Jentleson, B. 1992. “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on 
the Use of Military Force.” International Studies Quarterly 36: 49–74. 
Jentleson, B., and R.L. Britton. 1998. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American 
Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 
(4): 395–417. 
Jordan, D.L., and B.I. Page. 1992. “Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV 
News.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (2): 227–41. 
Karol, D., and E. Miguel. 2007. “The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 
2004 U.S. Presidential Election.” The Journal of Politics 69 (3): 633–48. 
Kesselman, M., J. Krieger, and W. Joseph. 2004. Introduction to Comparative Politics. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Klarevas, L. 2002. “The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations.” International 
Studies Perspectives 3: 417–37. 
 130 
 
Koch, M., and S.S. Gartner. 2005. “Casualties and Constituencies: Democratic 
Accountability, Electoral Institutions, and Costly Conflicts.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49 (6): 874–94. 
Koch, M., and P. Sullivan. 2010. “Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, 
Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions.” The 
Journal of Politics 72: 616–29. 
Kriner, D., and F.X. Shen. 2007. “Iraq Casualties and the 2006 Senate Elections.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 32: 507–30. 
Kull, S., C. Ramsay, and E. Lewis. 2004. “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq 
War.” Political Science Quarterly 118 (4): 569–98. 
Kunda, Z. 1999. Social Cognition: Making Sense of People. Cambridge, MA: Bradford. 
Kusnitz, L.A. 1984. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Lacy, D., and E. Niou. 2004. “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The 
Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats.” The Journal of Politics 66 (1): 25–
42. 
Lafeber, W. 1977. “American Policy-Makers, Public Opinion and the Outbreak of the 
Cold War, 1945-1950.” In The Origins of Cold War in Asia. Y. Nagai and A. Iriye. 
New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 
Lake, D., and R. Powell. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 131 
 
Lau, R.R., and D.P. Redlawsk. 1997. “Voting Correctly.” American Political Science 
Review 91: 585–98. 
Levendusky, M., and M. Horowitz. 2012. “When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: 
Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs.” Journal of Politics 74 (2): 
323–38. 
Leventoglu, B., and A. Tarar. 2008. “Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in 
Crisis Bargaining?” International Studies Quarterly 52: 533–53. 
Levering, R.B. 1978. The Public and American Foreign Policy. New York: Morrow. 
Levy, J. 1998. “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace.” Annual Political 
Science Review 1: 139–65. 
Levy, M. 1995. “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International Security 
20 (2): 35–62. 
Lewis-Beck, M., and T. Rice. 1982. “Presidential Popularity and Presidential Votes.” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 46: 534–37. 
Lippmann, W. 1922. Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan. 
———. 1925. The Phantom Public. New York: Hartcourt.  
———. 1955. Essays in the Public Philosophy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Lipset, S.M. 1966. “The President, the Pools, and Vietnam.” Transaction 
September/October: 19–24. 
Lupia, A.M., and M.D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens 
Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 132 
 
Mandelbaum, M. 1996. “Foreign Policy as Social Work.” Foreign Affairs 
(January/February): 16–32. 
Maoz, Z., and B. Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 
1946-1986.” The American Political Science Review 87 (3):624–38. 
Martin, L. 1993. “Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic 
Sanctions.” World Politics 45 (3): 406–32. 
McDermott, R. 2002. “Experimental Methods in Political Science.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 5: 31–61. 
———. 2011. “Internal and External Validity.” In Cambridge Book of Experimental 
Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mermin, J. 1997. “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of 
a Media-driven Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 112 (3): 385–404. 
Miller, W.E., and D.E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” American 
Political Science Review 57: 45–56. 
Mintz, A., S.B. Redd, and A. Vedlitz. 2006. “Can We Generalize from Student 
Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and 
International Relations?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (5): 757–76. 
Monroe, A. 1979. “Consistency Between Public Preferences and National Policy 
Decision.” American Politics Quarterly 7: 3–19. 
Mook, D. 1983. “In Defense of External Invalidity.” American Psychologist: 379–87. 
Morgenthau, H., and K.W. Thompson. 1993. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace, Brief Edition. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. 
 133 
 
Morton, R., and K. Williams. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of 
Causality: From Nature to the Lab. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mueller, J. 1971. “Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam.” 
American Political Science Review 65: 358–75. 
———. 1973. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley. 
Myers, N. 1993. Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability. New 
York: W.W. Norton. 
Nincic, D., and M. Nincic. 1995. “Commitment to Military Intervention: The 
Democratic Government as Economic Investor.” Journal of Peace Research 32 (4): 
413–26. 
Nincic, M. 1988. “The United States, The Soviet Union, and The Politics of Opposites.” 
World Politics 40: 452–75. 
———. 1990. “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection.” World Politics 42: 
370–96. 
Nincic, M., and B. Hinckley. 1991. “Foreign Policy and the Evaluation of Presidential 
Candidates.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (2): 333–55. 
Nincic, M., and P. Wallensteen. 1983. Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in 
World Politics. New York: Praeger. 
Oneal, J.R., B. Russett, and M.L. Berbaum. 2003. “Causes of Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992.” International Studies 
Quarterly 47: 371–93. 
 134 
 
Ostrom, E. 2000. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 137–58. 
Page, B.I., and R.Y. Shapiro. 1983. “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.” American 
Political Science Review 77: 175–90. 
———. 1988. “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
32: 211–47. 
———. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American’s Policy 
Preferences. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 
Pape, R. 1997. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” International Security 22 (2): 
90–136. 
Paterson, T.G. 1979. “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The 
Truman Years.” Diplomatic History 3: 1–18. 
Peffley, M., and J. Hurwitz. 1992. “International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: 
Public Responses to Changing Soviet-American Relations.” American Journal of 
Political Science 36: 431–61. 
———. 1993. “Models of Attitude Constraint in Foreign Affairs.” Political Behavior 15 
(1): 61–90. 
Peffley, M., R.E. Langley, and R.K. Goidel. 1995. “Public Responses to the Presidential 
Use of Military Force: a Panel Analysis.” Political Behavior 17: 307–37. 
Perla, H. 2011. “Explaining Public Support for the Use of Military Force: The Impact of 
Reference Point Framing and Prospective Decision Making.” International 
Organization 65: 139–67. 
 135 
 
Pew Research Center. 2012. “Public Takes Strong Stance Against Iran’s Nuclear 
Program/Support for Obama’s Afghan Troop Pullout Poll February 8-12 2012.” Pew 
Research Center. http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/15/public-takes-strong-
stance-against-irans-nuclear-program/. 
Popkin, S.L. 1993. “Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter.” In Information, 
Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective., 17–
35. B. Grofman. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press. 
———. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential 
Campaigns. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 
Putnam, R. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games.” 
International Organization 42 (3): 427–60. 
Roberts, A. 1993. “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights.” 
International Affairs 69 (3): 429–49. 
Romm, J. 1993. Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects. New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
———. 1966. Arms and Influence. Fredericksburg, VA: Yale Univ. Press. 
Schultz, K. 2001a. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two 
Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization 53 
(2): 233–66. 
———. 2001b. “Looking for Audience Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (1): 
32–60. 
 136 
 
Sears, D. 1986. “College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data 
Base on Social Psychology’s View of Human Nature.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 51 (3): 515–30. 
Sigelman, L. 1979. “Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 43: 532–34. 
Slantchev, B. 2006. “Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs.” 
International Studies Quarterly 50: 445–77. 
Smith, A. 1998. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.” The American Political 
Science Review 92 (3): 623–38. 
Sniderman, P.M., and R.A. Brody. 1991. Reasoning and Choice. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Snyder, J., and E. Borghard. 2011. “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound.” 
American Political Science Review 105 (3): 437–56. 
Sobel, R. 1989. “Public Opinion About the United States Intervention in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.” Public Opinion Quarterly 53: 114–28. 
———. 2001. The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. 
New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Strøm, K. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” 
European Journal of Political Research 37: 261–89. 
Tarar, A., and B. Leventoglu. 2012. “Limited Audience Costs in International Crises.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming).  
 137 
 
Taylor, S., and S. Fiske. 1978. “Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head 
Phenomena.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 11: 249–88. 
Taylor, S.E., and J. Crocker. 1981. “Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing.” 
In Social Cognition, 89–134. E.T. Higgins; C.P. Herman; M.P. Zanna. Hillsdale, NJ: 
L. Erlbaum Associates. 
Taylor, S.E., and S.T. Fiske. 1975. “Point of View and Perceptions of Causality.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (3): 439–45. 
Taylor-Robinson, M. 2010. Do the Poor Count: Democratic Institutions and 
Accountability in a Context of Poverty. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
Univ. Press. 
Tomz, M. 2007. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach.” International Organization 61 (4): 821–40. 
Trachtenberg, M. 2012. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis.” Security Studies 21: 
3–42. 
Trager, R., and L. Vavreck. 2011. “The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential 
Rhetoric and the Role of Party.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 526–
45. 
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice.” Science 211 (4481): 453–58. 
Ullman, R. 1983. “Redefining Security.” International Security 8 (1): 129–53. 
Vavreck, L. 2009. The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
 138 
 
Vertzberger, Y. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, 
and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press. 
Voeten, E., and P. Brewer. 2006. “Public Opinion, the War in Iraq, and Presidential 
Accountability.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (6): 809–30. 
Whang, T. 2011. “Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in 
the United States.” International Studies Quarterly 55 (3): 787–801. 
Wren, C. 2005. “Parliament, Accountability and the Foreign Policy in the UK.” 
Accountability Forum 8: 41–45. 
Zaller, J. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
Univ. Press. 
 139 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Experimental Scenarios for Test of Theory with American Students 
 
(1) INSTRUCTIONS (Same for all conditions) 
Democratic Accountability 
Instructions: 
The following questions are about U.S. relations with other countries around the world. 
You will read about a situation our country has faced in the past and will probably face 
again in the future. Different U.S. leaders have handled the situation in different ways. 
We will describe a particular international incident and how the U.S. President 
approached it, then ask you your opinion about this incident. 
 
(2) EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS  
A. The Executive backs down after threatening Military Intervention in a Salient 
Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. The attackers are advancing rapidly and are about to invade Uzbekistan’s 
capital and take over the whole country. An Uzbekistani farmer that witnessed the 
invasion declared that: “We were in the middle of harvesting our crops and we heard this 
loud bang. At first I couldn’t see anything for there was dust and dirt all over the place 
but I could hear people screaming. As soon as the dirt began to settle I realized 
Kazakhstan men in uniform had thrown a bomb and there was blood all over the place. I 
don’t see why they would attack us like this.”  
 
If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over the whole country, Asia’s regional balance 
of power will shift drastically. This will significantly affect U.S. economic and 
security interests in Asia. Kazakh authorities have time after time demonstrated they 
are very hostile against the U.S.  
 
Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president in a public statement in the media said 
that the United States would send U.S. troops to defend the weaker country from its 
invaders.  
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If Uzbekistan’s capital is invaded U.S. economic and security interests in the 
region will be very significantly affected. 
• The U.S. president said he would send troops to defend the weaker nation.  
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In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the President acted? 
0= Definitely disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. In the end, the President of the U.S. did not send 
troops. 
To summarize this international crisis and the U.S. President’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If Uzbekistan’s capital is invaded U.S. economic and security interests in the 
region will be very significantly affected. 
• The U.S. president said he would send troops to defend the weaker nation.  
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The U.S. President did not send troops.  
 
B. The Executive consistently imposes Economic Coercion in a non-Salient Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. The attackers are advancing rapidly and are about to invade Uzbekistan’s 
capital and take over the whole country. An Uzbekistani farmer that witnessed the 
invasion declared that: “We were in the middle of harvesting our crops and we heard this 
loud bang. At first I couldn’t see anything for there was dust and dirt all over the place 
but I could hear people screaming. As soon as the dirt began to settle I realized 
Kazakhstan men in uniform had thrown a bomb and there was blood all over the place. I 
don’t see why they would attack us like this.”  
 
If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over their neighbor, neither the safety nor the 
economy of the United States will be affected.  
 
Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president in a public statement in the media said 
that the United States would impose economic sanctions on the government of 
Kazakhstan.  
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, neither the safety nor the economy of the United States 
will be affected.  
• The U.S. president said he would impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.   
 
In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the President  
0= Definitely disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
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Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. The President of the U.S. did impose economic 
sanctions on Kazakhstan’s government.  
 
To summarize this international crisis and the U.S. President’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, neither the safety nor the economy of the United States 
will be affected.  
• The U.S. president said he would impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.  
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The U.S. did impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.  
 
(3) QUESTIONNAIRE (Same for all conditions)52 
Now that you have all the information regarding how the President of the U.S. acted in 
this international crisis, do you approve of how he acted?  
0= Definitely disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Was the international crisis you just read about relevant? 
Yes, U.S. economic and security interests were going to be significantly affected 
No it wasn’t, neither the safety nor the economy of the U.S. were going to be affected 
 
What did the President say he was going to do in the report you just read about? 
Announced the U.S. was going to send troops to stop the aggressors 
Announced the U.S. was going to impose economic sanctions on the aggressors 
 
What did the President end up doing in the report you just read about? 
Sent U.S. troops 
Imposed economic sanctions 
He did nothing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 The experimental protocol included additional items that are not part of my dissertation. These items 
were introduced after both approval measures and thus their inclusion dies not impact the results presented 
here.  The final three items are manipulation checks.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Experimental Scenarios for Test of Theory with British Students 
 
(1) INSTRUCTIONS (Same for all conditions) 
Democratic Accountability 
Instructions: 
The following questions are about British relations with other countries around the 
world. You will read about a situation our country has faced in the past and will 
probably face again in the future. Different British leaders have handled the situation in 
different ways. We will describe a particular international incident and how the British 
Prime Minister approached it, and ask whether you approve or disapprove.  
 
(2) EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS  
A. The Prime Minister backs down after threatening Military Intervention in a 
Salient Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. The attackers are advancing rapidly and are about to invade Uzbekistan’s 
capital and take over the whole country. An Uzbekistani farmer that witnessed the 
invasion declared that: “We were in the middle of harvesting our crops and we heard this 
loud bang. At first I couldn’t see anything for there was dust and dirt all over the place 
but I could hear people screaming. As soon as the dirt began to settle I realized 
Kazakhstan men in uniform had thrown a bomb and there was blood all over the place. I 
don’t see why they would attack us like this.”  
 
If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over the whole country, Asia’s regional balance 
of power will shift drastically. This will significantly affect British economic and 
security interests in Asia. Kazakh authorities have time after time demonstrated they 
are very hostile against the U.K.  
 
 Shortly after the attack, the British Prime Minister in a public statement in the 
media said that the U.K. would send British troops to defend the weaker country 
from its invaders. 
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If Uzbekistan’s capital is invaded British economic and security interests in the 
region will be very significantly affected. 
• The British Prime Minister said he would send troops to defend the weaker 
nation.  
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In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the Prime Minister acted? 
 0= Definitely Disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. In the end, the British Prime Minister did not 
send troops. 
 
To summarize this international crisis and the Prime Minister’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If Uzbekistan’s capital is invaded British economic and security interests in the 
region will be very significantly affected. 
• The British Prime Minister said he would send troops to defend the weaker 
nation.  
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The British Prime Minister did not send troops.  
 
B. The Prime Minister consistently imposes Economic Coercion in a non-Salient 
Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. The attackers are advancing rapidly and are about to invade Uzbekistan’s 
capital and take over the whole country. An Uzbekistani farmer that witnessed the 
invasion declared that: “We were in the middle of harvesting our crops and we heard this 
loud bang. At first I couldn’t see anything for there was dust and dirt all over the place 
but I could hear people screaming. As soon as the dirt began to settle I realized 
Kazakhstan men in uniform had thrown a bomb and there was blood all over the place. I 
don’t see why they would attack us like this.”  
 
If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over their neighbor, neither the safety nor the 
economy of the U.K. will be affected.  
 
Shortly after the attack, the British Prime Minister in a public statement in the media 
said that the U.K. would impose economic sanctions on the government of 
Kazakhstan.  
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, neither the safety nor the economy of the U.K. will be 
affected.  
• The British Prime Minister said he would impose economic sanctions on 
Kazakhstan.   
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In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the Prime Minister acted?  
0= Definitely Disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. The British Prime Minister did impose 
economic sanctions on Kazakhstan’s government.  
 
To summarize this international crisis and the Prime Minister’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, neither the safety nor the economy of the U.K. will be 
affected.  
• The British Prime Minister said he would impose economic sanctions on 
Kazakhstan.  
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The U.K. did impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.  
 
(3) QUESTIONNAIRE (Same for all conditions)53 
Now that you have all the information regarding how the British Prime Minister acted in 
this international crisis, do you approve of how he acted?  
0= Definitely Disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Was the international crisis you just read about relevant? 
Yes, British economic and security interests were going to be significantly affected 
No it wasn’t, neither the safety nor the economy of the U.K. were going to be affected 
 
What did the Prime Minister say he was going to do in the report you just read about? 
Announced the U.K. was going to send troops to stop the aggressors 
Announced the U.K. was going to impose economic sanctions on the aggressors 
 
What did the Prime Minister end up doing in the report you just read about? 
Sent British troops 
Imposed economic sanctions 
He did nothing 
 
Are you a British citizen? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The experimental protocol included additional items that are not part of my dissertation. These items 
were introduced after both approval measures and thus their inclusion dies not impact the results presented 
here.  Three of the items shown here are manipulation checks.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Experimental Scenarios for Test of Theory with National American Sample 
 
(1) INSTRUCTIONS (Same for all conditions) 
Democratic Accountability 
Instructions: 
This experiment studies U.S. relations with other countries around the world. You will 
read about a situation our country has faced in the past and will probably face again in 
the future. Different U.S. leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will 
describe a particular international incident and how the U.S. President approached it, and 
ask whether you approve or disapprove.  
 
(2) EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS  
A. The Executive backs down after threatening Military Intervention in a Salient 
Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, the country that has been invaded, has abundant mines of high 
quality uranium that can be used for the development of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan, 
the invading country has a history of supporting anti-Western and anti-U.S. terrorist 
groups. A victory by the attacking country would constitute a severe risk to U.S. 
national security. 
Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president in a public statement in the media said 
that the United States would send U.S. troops to defend the weaker country from its 
invaders. 
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues it will constitute a severe risk to U.S. national security 
interests. 
• The U.S. president said he would send troops to defend the weaker nation.  
 
In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the President acted? 
0= Definitely disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
 
Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. In the end, the President of the U.S. did not send 
troops. 
 
To summarize this international crisis and the U.S. President’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues it will constitute a severe risk to U.S. national security 
interests. 
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• The U.S. president said he would send troops to defend the weaker nation.  
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The U.S. President did not send troops. 
  
B. The Executive consistently imposes Economic Coercion in a non-Salient Crisis:  
International Crisis in Asia 
Kazakhstan, an Asian country, sent its military to take over its weaker neighbor 
Uzbekistan. The attackers are advancing rapidly and are about to invade Uzbekistan’s 
capital and take over the whole country. If Kazakhstan’s military forces do take over 
their neighbor, it will pose no threat to U.S. national security. However, these actions 
constitute a clear violation of international law as chartered by the United Nations. 
Shortly after the attack, the U.S. president in a public statement in the media said that the 
United States would impose economic sanctions on the government of Kazakhstan.  
 
To summarize,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, U.S. national security will not be threatened 
although international law is being violated.  
• The U.S. president said he would impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.   
 
In the crisis you just read about, do you approve of how the President acted? 
0= Definitely disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
 
Kazakhstan has continued its invasion. The U.S. did impose economic sanctions on 
Kazakhstan.  
 
To summarize this international crisis and the U.S. President’s reactions to it,  
• Kazakhstan has invaded her weaker neighbor Uzbekistan. 
• If the invasion continues, U.S. national security will not be threatened 
although international law is being violated.   
• The U.S. president said he would impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan.   
• Kazakhstan has continued the invasion. 
• The U.S. did impose economic sanctions on Kazakhstan 
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(3) QUESTIONNAIRE (Same for all conditions)54 
Now that you have all the information regarding how the President of the U.S. acted in 
this international crisis, do you approve of how he acted? 
0= Definitely Disapprove 10= Definitely Approve 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
 
How threatening is the situation described to the U.S.? 
0=not Threatening at all 10=Very Threatening 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
How relevant is the crisis you just read about to the national security of the U.S.? 
0 = Very Irrelevant 10= Very Relevant 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
Do you think the President’s initial proposed policy is effective in dealing with this 
international crisis? 
0= Not effective at all  10= Very effective 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
 
What did the President say he was going to do in the report you just read about? 
Announced the U.S. was going to implement economic sanctions on the aggressors 
Announced the U.S. was going to send troops to stop the aggressors 
 
What did the President end up doing in the report you just read about? 
Imposed economic sanctions 
Sent U.S. troops 
He did nothing 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 The experimental protocol included additional items that are not part of my dissertation. These items 
were introduced after both approval measures and thus their inclusion dies not impact the results presented 
here.  The final four items are manipulation checks. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Randomization Check 
To ensure randomization took place in the study conducted with the national 
sample of American adults I conducted a multinomial logistic regression checking 
whether demographic characteristics and political affiliation predicted the assignment of 
participants to experimental conditions.55 The following tables show the results. The 
only factor that is statistically significant is ethnicity in the likelihood of being assigned 
to the eighth experimental condition (there are less whites in this condition).  
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION I: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation  .040 (.076) 0.597 
Age .005 (.009) 0.558 
Education .124 (.091) 0.173 
Ethnicity .023 (.159) 0.880 
Gender -.087 (.318) 0.785 
Income -.024 (.039) 0.534 
Constant -1.529 (1.177) 0.194 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION II: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation  .007 (.0754) 0.924 
Age .006 (.009) 0.494 
Education .027 (.088) 0.762 
Ethnicity .042 (.154) 0.785 
Gender -.011 (.313) 0.973 
Income -.027 (.039) 0.486 
Constant -.474 (1.134) 0.676 
      
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION III: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation  .081 (.075) 0.277 
Age .008 (.009) 0.358 
Education -.006 (.088) 0.945 
Ethnicity .014 (.153) 0.926 
Gender .258 (.309) 0.404 
Income .018 (.039) 0.644 
Constant -1.370 (1.134) 0.227 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Scenario VI was the base level. 
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EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION IV: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation .049 (.073) 0.504 
Age .014 (.009) 0.108 
Education -.087 (.085) 0.307 
Ethnicity -.058 (.157) 0.714 
Gender -.060 (.305) 0.845 
Income .046 (.039) 0.238 
Constant -.406 (1.100) 0.712 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION V: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation .081 (.075) 0.279 
Age .014 (.009) 0.117 
Education -.040 (.089) 0.652 
Ethnicity -.146 (.169) 0.387 
Gender .215 (.310) 0.489 
Income .069 (.041) 0.091 
Constant -1.654 (1.154) 0.152 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION VII: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation  .003 (.074) 0.965 
Age .013 (.009) 0.151 
Education -.020 (.086) 0.814 
Ethnicity .236 (.139) 0.089 
Gender -.252 (.307) 0.412 
Income .0481 (.040) 0.222 
Constant -1.044 (1.105) 0.345 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION VIII: 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Political Affiliation .063 (.079) 0.425 
Age .006 (.010) 0.530 
Education .046 (.091) 0.613 
Ethnicity .318 (.141) 0.024 
Gender -.144 (.324) 0.657 
Income .011 (.041) 0.790 
Constant -1.694 (1.172) 0.148 
 
 
 
 
 
